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L ib a tio n s
Sing, Muse, o f conflict, the seed of selfish labor.
How destruction and tragedy grow from its root.
What people will do for property and pride,
Of what will be sacrifie^ for one's right.
Tell of dead fish and dry streams, the birds' last feast,
How poison creeps through the land, by human hand and fate. 
Let us hear of the break between people.
That threatens our common future.
-If Helen were a river, what then?
"Never under-estimate the power of water."
m
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Prologue
Upper Clark Fork Basin is a place of rolling mountains and headwater streams; 
where heavy mantels of pine and fir cover ridges like buffalo robes keeping off the cold 
and wind; where protruding-elbow-hillsides get chapped and grow tough with cushion 
plants; and arid valley lowlands lie draped in bunchgrass lace. This is home to elk, deer, 
osprey, bear, chokecherry, cutthroat, woodpecker, bighorn, bitterroot, raven, crayfish, 
grouse, mycorrhizae, dragonfly, ninebark, magpie, coyote, to name only a few of the 
diverse species native to the Basin. It is also home to a political species.
The political species, humankind, plays a special role in the Basin by virtue of its 
capacity to influence the landscape more than any other species. While other species seem 
to participate in the landscape, humans are distinct as the species that takes control of the 
landscape, changing it to meet human-defined needs and interests. This is not to say that 
other species do not change the environment by living in it — they do. But humans are 
distinguished by the relative magnitude of the changes they, or we, induce. The Berkeley 
Pit, for example, a giant, open-pit mining site in the upper reaches of the Basin, changes 
the landscape much more dramatically than, say, a ground squirrel colony or even a 
marmot colony. Similarly, extensive cattle ranching introduces new species to the Basin, 
thereby diminishing and changing the habitat available to native species. As a result of these 
and other activities, the Basin landscape is largely a human creation.
Part of this landscape that humans transform is its waterways. Coursing through 
the Basin is the river for which it is named; a river changed by mining, ranching, power 
production and other human activities. From the continental divide to Milltown Dam, 
inconspicuous trickles gather into streams, which in turn gather into creeks, and then into 
rivers. The Clark Fork mainstem begins in Deer Lodge Valley, where Silver Bow Creek 
meets Warm Springs Creek. Farther down it takes in the Little Blackfoot River, then Gold
1
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Creek, Flint Creek, and finally at the lower end of the Basin, Rock Creek and the Blackfoot 
River, At Milltown Dam the river leaves Upper Clark Fork Basin, travelling on through 
gorges and reservoirs, whitewater and fish ladders, to join the Columbia and return to the 
sea.
Throughout the Basin, humans use this water, as do other species. The many life 
forms of the Basin have this in common; all rely on water. But human use of water is again 
distinguished by the magnitude of its effect on the rest of the Basin community. For 
example, when water is diverted for irrigation, stream temperatures change, fish lose 
habitat, and riparian habitat loses its productivity. When these effects are multiplied by 
numerous irrigation projects, they begin to influence the very viability of fish and wildlife 
populations. Toxic runoff from old mining sites and soil erosion add to this. Together, we 
humans have the capacity to transform these waterways to a point where the Basin will no 
longer be a viable home for some species, possibly even ourselves. In view of this, there is 
reason to be thoughtful and circumspect in deciding how we use these waterways and what 
shape we give the Basin's landscape.
This paper is about how landscape decisions are made. More specifically, it is 
concerned with how this political species, the human population, of Upper Clark Fork 
Basin, Montana will decide the future of the Basin's waterways.
There are a variety o f ways in which this decision could be made. Often, the 
political species makes its choices in a chaotic manner; individuals pursue their own 
interests throughout the Basin, the results of which combine into a situation that can be 
thought o f as the culmination of many choices. This method, the chaotic method, is 
legitimized by the custom of private property and seems to work fine until disputes erupt 
between individuals. When disputes occur, which is fairly often, political struggles tend to 
ensue. Struggle is another common method of decision-making. Played out in various
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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political arenas, the struggle to dominate characterizes adversarial methods of decision­
making. Adversarial methods are a potential back-up system for the chaotic method. These 
also seem to work fine, unless one happens to lose the struggle.
A third and perhaps less common kind of decision-making is found in collaborative 
methods. These can be used to resolve disputes that erupt via the chaotic method, or as a 
substitute for the same. Collaborative methods are designed to resolve differences through 
discourse, building consensus on decisions rather than struggling to dominate. By 
emphasizing constructive struggle, the political species can make choices in common and 
not just as individuals. Collaborative methods are ways of reaching agreements on what to 
do, thus deciding together. Such approaches can also be taken before disputes develop.
In Upper Clark Fork Basin, transfiguration of the waterways has so far come about 
in a predominantly chaotic manner. Individuals with water rights and property rights have 
pretty much pursued their own interests, remaking the landscape to meet their own ttesigns 
with little regard for the larger picture. The harmful impacts o f some activities, the 
combined impacts of the many activities, and the needs of other species were seldom taken 
into account so long as they were unknown, water seemed plentiful, and no one objected. 
But since people have become more cognizant of environmental impacts and water has 
become more scarce, objections and disputes have developed and multiplied. The dispute 
focussed on in this paper revolves around whether the Basin's remaining unclaimed water, 
what little there is, will be reserved for wildlife or reserved for irrigation, l The issue at 
hand is whether it would be better to make this decision in an adversarial or a collaborative 
manner.
 ̂Looming in the background are other unresolved disputes and serious water quality 
problems; including an ominous acid bath, the Berkeley Pit, gradually filling up at the top 
of the Basin.
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The Basin is a place where decisions have often been made on the basis of 
adversarial struggles. In this it is not unique. Culturally-honored political practices like 
majoritarian rule and litigation are based on the idea of struggle between opposing interests. 
These practices set up a convention, or rule, by which to pick a winner. Opponents base 
strategies on the expectation that the winner takes all and the loser gets nothing, which is 
often the case. Such conventions may be adopted out of esteem for their conceptual 
simplicity and seeming effectiveness in resolving difficult issues, or just on the basis of 
cultural norms. It should be realized, however, that they can also be oppressive, 
reductionist, and may entail various other significant costs — economic, social, political and 
environmental. Adversaries in the heat of struggle, bouyed by consciousness of their 
rights, may not recognize these costs or may perceive them as a necessary part of settling 
divisive issues. But once aware that there are alternatives in the form of collaborative 
methods, it is possible to weigh costs more deliberately and rethink adversarial 
conventions.
Where landscape decisions are concerned there are many reasons to prefer a 
collaborative approach. In the chapters that follow, these are discussed both generally and 
more specifically in terms of issues concerning Upper Clark Fork Basin that are now being 
deliberated. Many of these reasons are drawn from the study of processes of environmental 
dispute settlement. This provides insight into the shortcomings of adversarial methods and 
what this means for public decisions. Additional reasons for exploring a broader 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of collaborative methods are drawn 
from studies of public participation in resource planning.
Issues of fairness, as well as the epistemological and semantic bases of public 
decisions, are also important. At the heart of collaborative methods is an interactive process 
that implies the possibility of reaching agreements that are meaningful and trustworthy. By
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exploring theories of meaning and interactive communication, one can see the reductionism 
and oppression of adversarial methods. Ultimately, adversarial approaches to decision­
making tend to produce one sided decisions and monolithic interpretations of the public 
interest. Frequently, such actions end up obstructing rather than settling decisions and 
impairing the quality of decisions by reducing the issues on which they are based.
Finally, the study of communications and dispute resolution has also led to the 
development o f model decision-making procedures which are used as prescriptive 
guidelines for facilitating collaboration. These procedures are introduced and considered in 
terms of their applicability to the future of the waterways of Upper Clark Fork Basin, 
Montana.
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I. L andscape
Upper Clark Fork Basin is a place where the political species makes its home. Its 
landscape is influenced by climatic, geological, and ecological factors which have effected 
the distribution of species throughout the region. It is also influenced by cultural factors 
which have informed human activities in the region. The future well-being of the Basin 
hinges on how these factors come together. The relationship between evolved life patterns 
and a colonizing human culture can be judged felicitous only if it can pass the test of time. 
Human activities and their consequences are not exempt from natural selection. Like other 
species, we must be adapted to the Basin environment in order to thrive here. Unlike other 
species, we have a choice; we can either wait and see if our innovations hold up or we can 
become critical and try to tailor our innovations to evolved patterns.
The choice of whether to continue culturally approved practices or to begin a 
process of evaluation and possibly change rests primarily on whether we perceive problems 
with current practices. It makes little sense to fix what is not broken. This is true of 
production technologies as well as decision-making technologies. But the perception of 
problems is complicated by our interests. One cat's crisis is another cat's cream. Many of 
the problems in the Basin have this ambiguous character. Activities may be poorly adapted 
to the Basin environment, but still approved of within the culture and desirable because of 
short term interests. This type of situation leads to environmental disputes when the 
activities of some people are deemed harmful or poorly suited to the environment by others.
In recent years. Upper Clark Fork Basin has become the scene of environmental 
disputes. Part of its human population is content to continue practices which others have 
evaluated as problems that merit change. These disputes are rooted in the Basin landscape 
which is both a natural and human construction. In order to understand the disputes one 
must first consider the Basin's natural character and the culture for which it is home.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Basin. Upper Clark Fork Basin is a continuous region in Western Montana, 
drained by the Upper Clark Fork River and its tributaries. It is also a water planning unit 
defined by the State of Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 
(DNRC).^ As a planning unit, the Basin is one of several such units administered and 
overseen by the State. Until recently, the region has not been organized as a political unit 
and has had no planning organization by which Basin citizens could plan its future 
intentionally and inclusively. Because of a newly formed basin planning committee, 
organized by DNRC, this may now be possible to some extent. The basin committee was 
formed to resolve an entrenched dispute by developing a comprehensive plan for the 
Basin's waterways, excluding Blackfoot River and Rock Creek.
The Basin is bounded to the east and south by the Continental Divide. Abutting to 
the north and west are other basins that drain into the Clark Fork River farther downstream; 
Flathead Basin to the north and Middle Clark Fork Basin to the west. The official line 
dividing it from Middle Clark Fork Basin is Milltown Dam, which sits just below the 
confluence of the Clark Fork and Blackfoot rivers. It is a large region, covering a 
horizontal area of nearly six thousand square miles. The landscape is mountainous with 
peaks reaching upwards of 10,000 feet along the divide, and the river flowing from about 
5000 feet at its head down to about 3300 at the dam.
2 Sub-basins may also be treated as planning units under the state’s Natural Resources 
Information System. In this Basin, the Blackfoot River and Rock Creek drainages are 
regarded separately for some planning purposes.
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Because the flow of water connects upstream and downstream areas and influences 
the distribution of plant and animal species, the boundaries o f the Basin form a good 
ecological unit. The continental divide and the Flathead divide to the north are important 
natural boundaries between major river systems. Although the line between Upper Clark 
Fork Basin and Middle Clark Fork Basin seems more or less arbitrary, it too makes sense 
when human impacts are considered. Since the upper basin drains into the middle basin, 
the two are obviously connected; the Middle Clark Fork is not a separate river system. But 
Milltown Dam has a major effect on the river's water quality, changing its character at this 
point The upper basin is characterized by poor water quality due to mining tailings, most 
of which get trapped behind the dam. The boundary also serves to limit the size of the 
Basin, making a more manageable planning unit.
By virtue of proximity, the native flora and fauna of the Basin are similar to that of 
neighboring basins. Higher elevations are mostly slopes forested with douglas fir and 
lodgepole pine associations. Wildfires are a part o f these forest's ecology. Valleys are 
characterized by bunchgrass prairie, mostly fescues and wheatgrass intermixed with a 
surprising assortment of drought-tolerant forbs and less important grasses.^ Riparian areas 
tend to support chokecherry, willow, black cottonwood, and many other berry producing 
shrubs. The several basins also support similar associations of ungulates, predators, small 
mammals, birds, reptiles, insects and fish, with some differences resulting from climatic 
and geological variations between the basins.
The region is semi-arid, with higher elevations receiving most of the rainfall. Upper 
Clark Fork Basin is substantially dryer than Flathead Basin to the north due to the influence 
of Flathead Lake, whose broad surface area is the source of substantial evaporation which
3 "Less important" in an ecological sense means simply that these grasses account for a 
smaller proportion of the total ground cover than other species.
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later becomes rainfall over the mountains and valleys east of the lake. Another difference 
between these two basins is glaciation. The Upper Clark Fork was never glaciated and so 
has none of the rich glacial till and pothole ecology^ that can be found in the Flathead. In 
this it is similar to Middle Clark Fork Basin, which also was never glaciated and has no 
major lakes. But since this region's weather generally moves from west to east, the Upper 
Clark Fork gets somewhat less precipitation than the Middle Clark Fork Basin. Storms 
have less moisture to drop by the time they reach the Upper Basin.
Geologically, Upper Clark Fork Basin is unique for its ore deposits and mineral 
soils. Copper, gold, silver, arsenic and phosphate have been mined in the Basin and have 
also influenced its ecology and water quality. Even before mining began, heavy metals and 
arsenic were washed into the waterways with each year's spring flood.^ As a result, heavy 
metals, acids produced by their oxidation, and arsenic have influenced natural selection in 
the Basin for a long time. Riparian flora and fauna have had to be tolerant of these toxins in 
order to survive here.^ But such tolerance has limits. The species of the Basin have adapted 
to natural amounts of toxins that come with the normal, gradual erosion of the mountains. 
This is much less than what has resulted from mining, which increased erosion 
dramatically by digging and breaking up the ores.
Newcomers. Minerals have also influenced the Basin's ecology by attracting 
humans to the region. More than an hundred years ago, prospectors and miners came to 
find gold and copper and gain wealth from its ores. They came to mine, but also to live. 
Food, dwellings, and fuel were necessary. Schools, churches, transportation, decent
^ Potholes are shallow ponds formed when large chunks of ice broke off from retreating 
glaciers. These wetlands are important nesting sites for migrating birds and are a unique 
landform providing habitat for and influencing the behavior of numerous other species.
5 Source: Abe Horpestad, Water Quality Bureau, Montana Department of Health and 
Rivironmental Sciences (January 30,1992).
® Source: Paul Hanson, Montana Riparian Association, University of Montana School of 
Forestry (May 28, 1992).
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clothing and tools were expected. These humans brought their culture with them and settled 
in the Basin because it was a place where their expectations might be realized. With wealth 
in the ground, plenty of fuel, and unclaimed land, the Basin appeared to have the material 
potential to make culturally informed expectations and ambitions come true.
The people who settled the Basin came from many different places. Gold began to 
draw prospectors to the area in the 1850s. Some came to escape the chaos and disruptions 
of the Civil War, others simply to find a better life than they had in the East. The Western 
Frontier was a land of opportunity, promising land and wealth to people who lacked this in 
the East. It was also a land where opportunists could use their wealth to build an inland 
colony. When copper and silver veins were discovered, industrial mining began generating 
demand for labor in the Basin and a supply o f metals for the growing industrial nation. 
Butte, USA became a destination for immigrants and Easterners in pursuit of the American 
Dream. The Treasure State was on the map.
As mining developed, support industries were also necessary. Agriculture became 
important early on. Food for the growing population was grown partly in the Basin and 
partly in the neighboring Bitterroot Valley. In the Upper Basin, hay and grain were the 
major crops. Irrigation and the production of cattle for export have been important here 
since the last century. Meanwhile, railroad tracks were laid through the Basin to connect its 
parts and connect the whole to the outside economy. Timber was harvested for fuel, 
dwellings and railroad ties. Logs and building materials later became a third major product 
exported from the Basin. Mining products, cattle, and timber are the Basin's primary 
exports, and their production has been a livelihood for many residents.
The culture, or mix of cultures, that people brought to the region reflected their 
many diverse origins as well as the larger industrial economy of which it was a colony. 
This hybrid culture was alien to the Basin and tied into the demands of a remote and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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sprawling nation. As a result, demands and the practices used to meet them were
sometimes "out of synch" with the Basin's natural, unique limitations. Rex Myers
describes Montana's endemic cycle of boom and bust in the following passive;
More subtly came a legacy of boom and bust: a cycle built on an extractive 
economy, dependant on outside markets, tied to non-renewable or unwisely 
managed resources. Since the gold rush o f the 1860s, the process has 
repeated itself in silver, copper, coal, petroleum and other minerals. Finite 
in quantity, these minerals generated prosperity. Communities, which often 
rose suddenly with discovery, would decline precipitously when the supply 
was exhausted. Renewable resources such as lumber, livestock and farm 
produce followed similar fluctuations. Mismanagement or overuse, the 
result was quick profits followed by temporary exhaustion. Yet even for the 
best managers, changes in market conditions far from Montana, or 
alterations in regional weather patterns, produced the same rise and fall in
revenue and optimism.^
Despite hard times, the people of the Basin take pride in its history. The Copper 
Kings of Butte are well-remembered. Visiting Butte and Anaconda, the promise of good 
old days can still be felt — the boom time, when wealth was waiting deep in the mountain 
for immigrant men who would brave the journey — then the hard truth of hard work 
making tough people. Miners have ridden the boom and bust o f the untamed West. 
Ranchers too have a proud heritage o f independence and the ruggedness to weather 
droughts. Their role is to produce the essential stuff of life; food and fiber without which 
other industry would be lost. Miners, ranchers, and loggers all know the spirit of this land 
— it bucks and jumps and keeps on cornin' — and alot of people get thrown off, or at least 
laid off.
Impacts on the Landscape. Under the influence of this culture, the Basin has 
sustained the effects o f more than a hundred years of mining, ranching, and forestry. 
Urban areas, recreation and other industries have also affected the landscape and the water 
that courses through i t  Today the landscape still appears relatively untrammeled to the
Myers (1984), p. 6.
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untrained eye; human population density is relatively sparse, forests still cover much of the 
mountains, big game and fish are plentiful in some parts. But many aspects o f the 
landscape have been altered dramatically since the advent of Euro-American settlers.
Mining has long been an economic mainstay of the Upper Clark Fork. It has also 
contributed more than any other activity to the degradation o f the Basin's waterways. First 
it was gold, then silver, copper, arsenic, phosphate and gravel. The legacy of this mining 
history includes three Superfund sites. Superfund was established by Congress in 1980 to 
clean up major toxic waste sites across the nation. These three sites — Silver Bow Creek/ 
Butte, Anaconda Smelter, and Milltown Reservoir — are the direct results of mining 
activities in the Butte-Anaconda area. A fourth Superfund site, the Montana Pole site in 
Butte, was generated by chemical treatment o f utility poles, posts and bridge timbers.® 
Under the combined influence of these sites, the Basin has become a toxic landscape.
These Superfund sites are on their way to becoming a significant scar on the Basin 
landscape. At present, however, the place is more of an oozing, open wound. The three 
mining sites include several smaller sites. Among these are the giant Berkeley Pit, several 
tailings ponds, devastated riparian areas strewn with tailings, and several sites polluted by 
the processing of ores and related products. Copper, arsenic, and acid runoff from tailings 
have pretty much killed Silver Bow Creek, and pollute the entire mainstem in varying 
degrees depending on dilution from inflowing creeks. Heavy metals accumulate behind 
Milltown Dam, where they pollute the aquifer. So much arsenic has seeped into the 
groundwater that many residents of Milltown can no longer drink safely from their wells.
Having been identified under Superfund, these former mining sites are now the 
subject of a Federally administered diagnosis and clean-up process. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and the sites' present owner, Atlantic Richfield Company
® "Clark Fork Basin Project: Status Report and Action Plan" (1988), sec. 3, pp. 21 - 23.
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(ARCO), reportedly work closely together to determine the extent of the problems and 
devise solutions. Litigation to determine how much of this damage should be paid for by 
ARCO is also in process. Despite public meetings and presentations designed to explain to 
residents what is going on, the actual decision-making process remains relatively opaque, 
making the close relationship between EPA and ARCO somewhat suspect. Whether this 
close cooperation will lead EPA to diagnose the problems in a way that benefits ARCO at 
the expense of the Basin community remains to be seen. Basin dwellers have little influence 
over the decisions of EPA.
Meanwhile, EPA and ARCO assure the public that an effective and reasonably 
thorough clean-up will eventually be implemented. Some projects to transform tailings 
ponds into wetlands and restore devastated streamsides are already underway. The Warm 
Springs Ponds near Anaconda, for example, are laid out in a series that works as a three 
tiered filtering system for the water passing through them. The nearly still water in the 
ponds allows heavy metals to settle out and stop oxidizing. Natural sedimentation will 
gradually bury these potential toxins, holding them in place and preventing the formation of 
acids. Although this sounds good, there are concerns regarding how wise it is to leave all 
these toxins in the flood plain. A good flood could flush out these wetlands, stirring up the 
sediments and the problem all over again. Moreover, the dams that hold these ponds in 
place are not fool proof. Just recently, a leak was discovered. The ability of these structures 
to withstand annual flooding and earthquakes is by no means certain, though it is clearly 
much less expensive than trying to remove the tailings from the flood plain altogether.
The Berkeley Pit is another formidable problem for which a viable solution has not 
yet been determined. Now that it is no longer being mined, the Pit is gradually filling up 
with extremely acidic groundwater. If the rate of fill continues, it will be full in about thirty 
years. Although this gives ARCO and EPA some time to figure out what to do, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 5
existence of a giant acid bath at the top o f the Basin is nevertheless disturbing. Human 
constructed bulwarks in underground mining shafts are part of what is holding this acid in 
place. So far, these are holding nicely, but whether they will continue to do so as the 
weight of the liquid increases is uncertain. If the bulwarks break, the adjacent active mining 
operation would be flooded, possibly releasing this acid into the Basin waterways.
Other mining sites in the Basin also contribute to the toxicity of its waters. The hills 
are dotted with smaller mining shafts, some o f which ooze a copper colored liquid, 
shunned even by insects. Placer mining, too, disrupted numerous creek beds, destroying 
riparian habitat and adding to the overall degradation of the river system. Although some of 
these smaller sites are beginning to be addressed under a State version of the Super fund 
program, their effects will continue to be felt for a long time. Meanwhile, the mining of 
Butte Hill continues. Ore is currently being pulled out of the hill faster than ever before.^ 
But although mining continues, its practices have changed. Littering streams with toxic 
waste is now illegal and consequently avoided. The current mining operation is 
considerably less harmful to the Basin than its predecessors.
The overall results of mining in the Basin mean that the life forms in the Basin, 
including humans, must adapt to living with poisoned water. Although the residents of 
Milltown have found alternative sources of water, the river's fish are not as lucky. Copper 
is extremely toxic to these fish and their populations have decreased substantially, mainly 
due to the impacts on spawning habitat. Hatchlings are especially vulnerable to heavy metal 
poisoning. Fish that do survive in diluted parts o f the river may still be toxic to the 
predators that eat them. Osprey are particularly vulnerable since their diet consists almost 
exclusively of fish. Other species that drink this water are also affected, although little 
research has been done to determine the extent of these effects. Acid streams also repress
 ̂Source: Marvin Miller, Montana Bureau of Mines and Geology (January 30, 1992).
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algae and riparian vegetation, further degrading the habitat of fish and other wildlife. The 
upshot is that toxic waterways and their consequences are now part of the Basin landscape 
within which context other life activities must go on.
Ranching has also been a major influence on the Basin landscape in the last hundred 
years. The introduction of cattle to the region affected native wildlife by usurping grazing 
land that was previously used by bison, elk, deer and antelope. Today, bison are long gone 
and antelope are rare. Although elk and deer still subsist fairly well in the forested areas, 
they too feel pressure from the overgrazing o f National Forest lands. Predators, 
meanwhile, were slaughtered to protect cattle. The Basin's wolf population has been 
annihilated and its grizzly population reduced to remnants. Cougars, black bears, and 
coyotes have also been reduced in number, but to a lesser degree since these species also 
benefitted from the removal of more efficient predators.
The region’s flora has also been changed by grazing cattle. Native bunchgrass 
prairie has been degraded by overgrazing and invaded in some places by hardier exotic 
species like quackgrass and knapweed. In other places, native prairie has been replaced by 
human-favored species imported for hay production. Forested areas have also been grazed, 
sometimes depleting undergrowth and interfering with forest regeneration. These impacts 
have in turn affected the lives and habitat of the many insects, spiders, birds and small 
mammals that rely on native species.
Poor ranching practices have also led to soil erosion problems and organic pollution 
o f the waterways. Overgrazing of the prairie destroys its plant cover, loosening soils 
previously anchored by the deep roots of bunchgrasses. This soil is then either lost to the 
wind or finds its way into the Basin's waterways. Uncontrolled grazing along streams and 
wetlands destroys riparian vegetation, destabilizing banks and transforming streambeds 
into muddy wallows. Resulting siltation of streambeds poses an additional obstacle for the
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river’s poisoned fish. Uncontrolled riparian grazing also allows organic waste, primarily 
phosphates and nitrates in the form of cow pies, to be dropped directly into streams. This 
addition deteriorates water quality with bacteria and causes algal blooms which degrade the 
habitat of fish and other riparian wildlife. Excessive algae depletes oxygen and modifies 
habitat by covering streambeds and surfaces with algae. Runoff from feedlots also 
contributes to nutrient pollution.
Perhaps the most dramatic transformation o f the landscape that has resulted from 
ranching is irrigation. In the arid west, irrigation has long been viewed as the key to 
successful agriculture. In Upper Clark Fork Basin, agriculture means ranching. Irrigation 
increases hay production, thereby increasing the cattle crop both in weight and numbers. It 
also stabilizes production levels which would otherwise be more susceptible to the periodic 
droughts which are characteristic of the region. For these reasons, irrigation projects dot 
the Basin's waterways much as old mining sites dot its hillsides. Most of these are small 
diversions and canals tailored to the needs of individual ranches. There are also a few larger 
reservoirs which serve the needs of several ranches.
Irrigation effects the Basin's waterways by removing water from streams and 
changing the path of water through the Basin. This inflicts drought conditions on riparian 
areas. Riparian vegetation becomes less productive, which in turn affects the wildlife that 
depends on it. For fish, less water means less habitat, including important spawning areas. 
Dewatering also increases water temperatures, putting additional stress on fish, especially 
hatchlings. When streams are diverted completely, habitat loss and drought conditions are 
taken to the extreme. Although most of the diverted water eventually finds its way back into 
streams as runoff, this does little to offset damage done to riparian species.
Dewatering due to irrigation also complicates the Basin's water quality problems. In 
lieu of cleanup, the effects of toxic waste from mining and other activities are diminished
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 8
only by dilution. This requires relatively clean streams flowing into the mainstem. When 
these streams are diverted for irrigation, dilution does not occur. As a result, the damage to 
fisheries in the mainstem is intensified while other potential fish habitat is lost in the 
tributaries. Although toxicity problems can hardly be blamed on irrigators, their actions 
nevertheless contribute to the destruction of the Basin's fisheries.
The Dispute. Between displacement of species, soil erosion, and exacerbation of 
the river’s water quality problems, ranching has altered the Basin’s evolved life patterns 
considerably. As a result, ranching practices have come under fire. Resource managers and 
environmental advocates are especially critical of what is happening to the Basin’s 
fisheries. Fish populations have been depleted dramatically from the combined effects of 
mining and ranching. Although remaining populations appear stable, they are threatened by 
two trends. Ranchers feeling economic pressure to increase productivity look to future 
irrigation projects for relief. At the same time, pressure from fishing is increasing due to the 
promotion of tourism and outdoor recreation as environmentally sensitive alternatives to 
extractive industries. The growing importance o f recreation to the region's economy is a 
strong incentive for protecting the Basin’s fish. This conflict of interests has now 
developed into a complicated dispute and led to the formation o f the basin planning 
committee mentioned earlier.
This situation is complicated by additional impacts of timber harvesting and 
municipal waste. Although timber is less important in the Upper Clark Fork than in basins 
to the north and west, the amount of harvesting is still substantial. Clearcutting is the usual 
practice. This removes forest cover and organic matter from the Basin’s slopes, affecting 
the habitat of numerous plant and animal species. In addition, the land may be scarred by 
bulldozers to help regeneration or tom up when trees are dragged from stump to truck. 
Both of these practices result in soil erosion which adds to the siltation of streambeds.
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Municipal wastes, meanwhile, are a major source of nutrient pollution in the Basin, Algal 
blooms and oxygen depletion are commonly found at sewage outflows, even when 
wastewata* has been treated.
Power production is also part of the picture. This industry also influences the 
Basin's waterways, primarily because of downstream demands. There are two hydropower 
dams in the Basin, one on Flint Creek at Georgetown Lake, and the Milltown dam. These 
have added reservoirs to the Basin and introduced new obstacles for migrating fish. 
Together with larger dams downstream on the Clark Fork and Columbia, they also generate 
a demand for full streams. Power production is a major industry in the Northwest. It is also 
the most cost-efficient use of the river in the region. The economic benefits of irrigation 
cannot compare to those of power. As a result, power production is another major incentive 
against future irrigation projects. With a few seasonal exceptions, diversion of water for 
irrigation also diverts potential watts away from the power industry.
The dispute which has developed around the welfare of the Basin's fisheries is 
complex because so many different human activities have contributed to the overall 
degradation of the waterways. Although future irrigation has been targeted as a major threat 
to fish, the Basin's problems cannot be attributed to irrigators alone. Technically speaking, 
however, restricting irrigation to ensure the river's dilution looks like an easy solution. 
Politically, it is not so simple. Ranchers are an influential group in the state, and their way 
of life has been mythologized into a symbol of rugged independence. To engage in political 
struggle with ranchers, is to take on the mythos of the American West.^® At the same time, 
the economic interests in fish and full streams undercuts the credibility o f resource 
managers and environmentalists who claim the fish are at risk. Because o f this it seems
High Country News (1987), pp. 9 - 10.
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unfair for ranchers to be asked to sacrifice their interests for the sake of tourism and power 
production.
This dispute came to a head in 1987 when two applications for water reservations^  ̂
were filed with DNRC. Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks requested that 
most of the Basin's remaining unclaimed water be reserved as instream flow in order to 
protect fish, wildlife and recreation from the negative impacts of additional diversions and 
other harmful activities. At the same time, the Granite County Conservation District 
requested that part of the Basin's unclaimed water be reserved behind two new dams in 
order to meet future irrigation needs which might otherwise be precluded by competing 
demands on the Basin's water supply. Given the Basin's limited supply of unclaimed 
water, both of these are not possible. Water can either be kept in the stream or held in the 
reservoirs; there is not enough to go around.
The Committee. Having received these requests, DNRC prepared an EIS 
examining the need and probable effects o f each. Normally, the Board of Natural 
Resources and Conservation would then have granted or denied the requests on this basis. 
But in this case, an unlikely coalition o f ranchers and environmentalists intervened, 
lobbying legislators to instead impose a moratorium on reservation decisions and new 
allocations in the Basin. These lobbyists had participated in a privately funded effort to get 
the Basin’s opposing interest groups talking and solving their problems together. They had 
reached an agreement among themselves that a moratorium was a good idea because it 
would allow time for a group like themselves to work out a mutually agreeable solution to 
the dispute and related problems. The legislature agreed, enacting the formation of a multi- 
interest basin committee to sort out the controversy surrounding the two applications and
1 ̂  Water reservations are a special kind of water right available to governmental units. 
They must be granted if need is established, and take precedence over claims of beneficial 
use on which water rights are based.
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develop a comprehensive plan for future water use in the Basin. In 1991, the Upper Clark 
Fork River Basin Steering Committee was formed and given until December 1994 to 
develop its plan.^^
This basin committee is also an integral part of Montana's developing State Water 
Plan. In 1988, DNRC began implementing a collaborative approach to water basin 
planning. Their policy goal is to set up representative basin committees in each of the 
state's water basins in order to develop plans that address the unique conditions, problems 
and interests pertaining to each water basin in the state. So far only two of these 
committees have been formed. Upper Clark Fork Basin Steering Committee is one of them. 
The committee's status as part of the state's water planning process explains why it was 
mandated to develop a comprehensive basin plan, rather than just developing a solution to 
the reservation dispute.
The basin committee's purpose is to find a way to distribute the Basin's limited 
water resources that will satisfy Basin humans. Such a plan may or may not meet the needs 
of the Basin's other species. In order to do so, it will have to overcome substantial cultural 
inertia.
Historically, ecological issues have not been a major concern of water users in the 
American West. When settlers occupied the West, they used water on a first come, first 
served basis. As they discovered the aridity o f the region, water was claimed more 
opportunistically, giving rise to an ethos of "use it or lose it." Resulting use patterns and 
water flows rarely make a coherent whole. The many uses were never integrated in a way 
to reflect concern for whole watersheds or best use of a limited resource. In some basins, 
the amount of water claimed is three or more times the average annual flow. The concept of
*2 Northern Lights, "Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee, October 28, 
1991 Meeting Summary.”
Martin (1987).
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"planning" to meet collective interests was, in most instances, simply not considered. 
When water planning did occur, it was usually for the sake of facilitating and maximizing 
human use of the resource, without regard for ecological effects. Diversions, ponds and 
canals built by private landowners are products of water planning. Government planning, 
meanwhile has produced massive interbasin diversions, dams, reservoirs, and streamlined 
channels.^'* Only recently have environmental issues begun to enter the picture as adverse 
ecological affects and (he limits of the resource become more apparent.
The legacy of this history is a dramatically altered landscape and a historically 
rooted conviction that water is there to be used, if only we can engineer a way to get it. The 
ecology of water basins remains secondary to human interests, despite growing under­
standing that the resource is limited and that human interests are ultimately dependent on 
the welfare of larger ecological systems. In this context, it makes sense to introduce a 
planning process that will emphasize the ecological processes at work in a water basin and 
consider possible water uses with reference to these. Whether the basin committee can do 
this is unclear.
The reservation dispute in the Upper Clark Fork can be viewed against the broader 
issue of sustainability and our relationship to the Basin's evolved patterns, but this is not 
the committee’s expressed purpose. In many human eyes, fish, like water, exist to be used. 
Despite the "catch and release" practice o f many recreational fisherpersons, fish are 
managed as a crop. Improved water quality and higher stream flows stand to increase 
productivity, which in turn increases economic benefits to humans. Although some Basin 
humans would probably like to see a healthy river for its own sake, or for ecological or 
even aesthetic reasons, such motivations rarely seem to enter the political arena. Use- 
oriented values are much more common.
14 Reisner (1986).
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A representative planning process may simply perpetuate and apply the notion that 
water is out there waiting to be used. The basin committees could endorse new projects to 
alter the landscape and exploit its water potential despite negative side-effects. In this case, 
water planning could continue to ignore basic ecological realities. This is speculation, but it 
points to serious concerns regarding the potential effects of representative procedures. 
Along similar lines as the classical argument that tyranny of the masses should be avoided 
by placing government in the hands of an educated few, an argument can be made against 
granting power over an ecological system to people who don’t understand how it works. If 
planning is guided more by political interests than any qualifying knowledge or expertise, 
the potential for ultimately harming the water basin and the long-term interests of its 
inhabitants is significant.
This interpretation of the situation, however, is by no means the only one possible. 
From a standpoint of ecological concern, there is reason to devise and introduce a planning 
process that gives ecological systems priority over use-oriented interests. From other 
standpoints, the importance of ecological processes and problems is debatable. In the event 
that people do not accept this, the elitist character o f the classical argument becomes 
evident. If specialized knowledge of ecological systems is a prerequisite to deciding what 
uses of a resource are acceptable, then many people are excluded from this decision. The 
requirement that other interests be framed in terms of sustainability and special regard be 
given to ecological problems can be viewed as a form of procedural hegemony. Framed in 
other terms, environmentalists are just one of many interests groups that want things their 
way. In view of this, a process that stresses environmental interests over other interests in 
the resource is liable to be regarded as politically biased and resisted.
Montana's approach to basin planning does not give any special status to ecological 
systems and problems. Instead, it is designed to resolve conflicts between the various
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interests in a water basin before these erupt into serious public disputes. Multiple interests, 
based on different perceptions and different priorities, are a central issue in resource 
planning. The challenge of resource planning is developing and implementing policies and 
allocation schedules that satisfy multiple interests without irreversibly damaging the 
resource in question. The new approach focuses on building consensual agreements 
between multiple interest groups, regardless of ecological consequences. The question of 
what is or is not damaging to the resource, meanwhile, is based on legal standards and 
regulations which limit the scope of agreements. The possibility that existing legal limits are 
not sufficient to protect the resource is cause for concern. Any concern for ecology over 
and above what the law prescribes depends on the members and context o f the planning 
committee.
Although this process may fall short of our ideal ecosystemic approach to planning, 
it still has promise from an environmental standpoint It is possible that consensus building 
will benefit ecosystems by building understanding between diverse interest groups and by 
averting resource conflicts. Building understanding between interests can benefit the 
ecosystem by promoting broader recognition the relevance of ecological issues and 
concerns. Resource conflicts, meanwhile, tend to absorb valuable time and energy while 
problems persist. Collaborative problem-solving allows important decisions to be made — 
rather than delayed. Despite concern that basin ecology will be ignored, it may also be 
respected.
Because the basin committee is undertaking to plan the region's use of water, it has 
an opportunity to consider the issue of sustainability in doing so. In planning the future of 
the Basin's waterways, it must choose between possible human activities which vary in 
how well-adapted they are to the Basin environment, among other qualities. This 
opportunity to select our future collectively is a radical departure from the chaotic pursuit of
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self-interest that led to this juncture. The committee provides an opportunity for Basin 
citizens to begin thinking broadly about the Basin's future, beyond immediate economic 
interests. Whether this will happen remains to be seen.
In general, the activities that have transformed the Basin were based on culturally 
informed technologies and values that were imported from elsewhere and did not reflect the 
established ecological character and limitations o f the Basin. Instead, the abrupt 
introduction of new styles o f production and living disrupted established ecological 
patterns. The new patterns, based on industrial civilization and human-defined needs and 
interests, were superimposed over existing patterns, causing disruptions because the old 
and new come into conflict at many points.
Disruptions of this kind are not necessarily bad or immoral, but need to be 
understood as innovations which may or may not fit within the limitations of the Basin's 
ecology. The choice between patterns and the struggle between old and new is not a simple 
a matter of preference; in this case one of the patterns has been reinforced by thousands of 
generations of gradual evolution. The notion that a pattern which dates back no more than 
three or four or even twenty generations can stand as a viable substitute for nature's slowly 
refined creation could be interpreted as reckless. Yet this kind of thinking seems to have 
guided us in transforming the landscape. This is especially true when new patterns tend 
towards depletion or disequilibrium. That is, if  the new pattern is not stable and 
sustainable, excessive disruption could be unravelling both patterns without regard for the 
slow stitches of nature's seamstress.
The choice between patterns is a choice between a range of possible human 
activities. The relationship between evolved patterns and human possibilities must be 
appreciated if we are to choose our actions responsibly. This relationship also precedes
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understanding modem environmental disputes. These have roots in colonialism, manifest 
destiny, and the universalizing tendencies of modem science.
Recently introduced modem practices are sometimes defended by pointing to the 
"unreasonableness" of environmentalists who expect people to have no impact on a place 
they live in. The idea of having no impact on the environment is an impossible ideal, easily 
portrayed as absurd. This is problematic because it obscures the more realistic criticism that 
our impacts should fit with established ecological pattems by not skewing them too far 
toward in sustainability. If this defense against environmentalists is taken seriously, it 
reveals a basic misunderstanding o f ecology and what is at stake. The defense portrays a 
winner take all scenario where colonizers can either have everything they want or nothing at 
all. This looks suspiciously like a zero sum game, an adversarial struggle, with nature 
itself. The problem is we cannot win against nature the way we might against one another. 
If nature loses, we lose — it is that simple.
Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee was bom of conflict. There's a 
saying in the West that whiskey's fo r  drinking and water's fo r  fighting. Upper Clark Fork 
Basin is no exception. The Committee came about because an adversarial dispute over the 
Basin's finite rivers and streams reached an impasse. But the committee itself departs from 
this paradigm. Its formation is an attempt to involve all sides in a collaborative effort to get 
beyond stalemate and move forward into a shared future. By providing a forum in which 
political discourse can complement political struggle, the committee provides an 
opportunity for the humans of the Basin to improve their interaction with one another, and 
possibly with the landscape as well.
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We need a story in which the processes o f communality and mutual 
responsibility are fundamental. We need to figure out how many popula­
tions we have, try to name their dreams, and begin resolving those dreams 
into a societal agenda for the future. It would seem reasonable to expect our 
politicians to take the lead in such processes, but they don't; they don't 
seem capable.
We need to take our politics back from the lawyers and the professionals 
and the boys with money (this is true, clearly, at every level in our 
democracy). If we can work our way through to public consensus the 
bureaucrats and lawyers will follow.
- William Kittredge, 1992
Environmental Disputes. The environmental dispute in Upper Clark Fork 
Basin, like others, is characterized by many humans having different designs for the same 
limited resource. Resolving such disputes requires a decision-making process. While 
personal decisions may be made by weighing our various interests and choosing one or 
some combination, the process of making decisions that affect more than one person is 
more complex. Such decisions become necessary when the interests of individuals or 
groups come into conflict and limited resources make it impossible for all parties to have 
what they want. The development of disputes is a familiar a social pattern. This pattern or 
type of problem, human conflict, is the probable origin of politics and government.
In a broad sense, environmental disputes can be understood to include all 
disagreements that involve the appropriate condition of the place in which we live. This 
includes everything from land use to job availability to air quality, green lawns, paved 
streets and correct behavior. All of these are aspects of the human landscape around which 
conflict can occur. This landscape, our habitat or community, is a limited resource. In this 
broad sense, all human disputes can be thought of as environmental, or landscape, 
disputes.
27
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In narrower terms, environmental disputes are just the subgroup of human disputes 
comprising those that have to do with the use, non-use, or abuse of limited natural 
resources. This includes renewable resources like fish and trees, nonrenewables like 
petroleum, and common necessities to life like clean air and water. Conflicts over the 
proper allocation and management of these resources have increased in frequency and 
importance as the frontiers of unclaimed land have diminished before an expanding 
industrial culture and a growing human population.
As industrial culture expands into alien landscapes and other cultures, it disrupts 
traditional ways of relating to landscapes. When industrial practices are poorly suited to 
local conditions, damage results. Other damage results from the introduction of cultural 
values that encourage the exploitation of resources. The economic rewards of exploitation 
undermine traditional practices and disrupt the intricate resource management systems of 
indigenous cultures. These harmful effects are complicated and augmented in many places 
by a rapidly growing human population. Resulting poverty and its attendant desperation 
contributes as well to the disruption of traditional environmental controls. Per capita 
consumption of resources is also growing in many places.
The picture is a crisis of overwhelming proportions. The planet has become like a 
large pie being fought over by its cannibal children. The finite nature of resources and the 
consequences o f their distribution affects everyone. Because these resources are limited, 
issues o f fair distribution and appropriate use are inseparable from the larger picture. 
Inequities in world resource distribution are part of an engine that drives the ongoing 
depletion. The comparative wealth of some people is both an ideal sought by those with 
less, and a major cause of the fact that those with less are finding it difficult or impossible 
to fulfill their basic needs. Poverty and the breakdown of traditional management systems
Myers (1984), p. 18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 9
is a widespread condition driving many people to use anything and everything available in 
their own environments to do this. Virtual scouring of the environment is destroying the 
renewable resource potential of many parts of the world. This leaves less of a resource base 
worldwide with which to satisfy the growing needs of a growing population.
In some situations, attempts to restrict environmental degradation have inadvertently 
harmed people and landscapes. By increasing poverty, restrictions on industry can end up 
causing more degradation than they prevent. This is not to say that restrictions and 
regulations are universally bad or harmful, but rather that we need to be circumspect in 
evaluating the probable outcomes of these measures. In order to protect resources 
effectively we need to consider what people want and need and find ways to balance this 
within the limits of available resources. In short, we need ways of living that are 
sustainable and acceptable to the people who are expected to undertake them. If restrictions 
are going to be effective in protecting resources, they must go hand in hand with the 
development of realistic alternatives to exploitative practices, which in turn must be 
informed by an understanding o f the problems faced by people who rely on these 
resources.
The several possible approaches to making landscape decisions can be thought of as 
a set o f tools with which to confront this formidable array of disputes and difficult 
decisions. This tool kit includes approaches identified as chaotic, adversarial, and 
collaborative. Once disputes have developed, the choice of alternatives is narrowed to 
adversarial and collaborative methods. The chaotic approach, which describes situations 
where the landscape is shaped by the aggregate of independently pursued human interests, 
breaks down when the limited nature of resources makes it impossible for all of these
World Conservation Strategy (1980), Our Common Future (1984).
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interests to be realized. In other words, the chaotic approach causes disputes to develop, 
creating a need for alternatives.
Alternative decision-making procedures are explored in depth in the growing 
literature on alternative dispute resolution. This field of study addresses public disputes of 
all kinds, including environmental, or landscape, disputes. Collaborative approaches, in 
particular, have become a subject of considerable interest as shortcomings o f more 
traditional adversarial methods have become more evident. Environmental disputes have 
received attention because they have increased in frequency in recent decades, a trend 
which is likely to continue.
Stalemate in the Courts. Bacow and Wheeler, in their seminal work on 
environmental dispute resolution, recognized four standard methods o f dispute resolution; 
litigation, arbitration, negotiation and mediation. Of these, litigation and arbitration are 
predominantly adversarial, while negotiation and mediation can be undertaken in either an 
adversarial or collaborative manner. Other authors include legislation and administrative 
procedures as additional alternatives.!^ These authors tend to examine and interpret 
litigation and otha" formal political processes as alternatives that often fail to settle disputes 
satisfactorily. They are acknowledged as an important part of the political context in which 
decisions are made, and then assigned to the background as other alternatives are discussed 
more thoroughly.
The main problem with litigation is the frequency with which it produces long, 
expensive battles, but little in the way of satisfactory solutions. Attorneys are usually 
expensive, especially if  a case continues for several years. Problems go unsolved while 
decisions hang in court and money disappears. Social costs of litigation accrue as time.
Bacow and Wheeler (1984).
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987); Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990).
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energy, and money are spent on litigation rather than more constructive projects. Prolonged 
non-decision can have serious consequences. In resource disputes, development projects 
may be interrupted indefinitely and environmental degradation may continue or worsen. 
The costs of litigation — economic, social, and environmental — are substantial. This 
supports the rationality of choosing to try other methods of dispute resolution.
Another problem with litigation is the tendency of issues to be resolved on narrow 
legal points that have little to do with the issues in dispute. Litigation may be used 
strategically for a variety of ends, such as buying time, putting fear into the adversary, and 
generating public issues and awareness. As a means of problem-solving and decision­
making, however, its merits are not compelling. In most cases the issues in dispute are not 
identical to the narrow, legal, procedural points on which the cases are d e c i d e d . T h e  
odds of coming up with a good solution when basic problems haven't been clarified and 
considered are not good. Cases are often decided on arbitrary grounds. When underlying 
issues are not resolved, conflict continues to tear away at the social fabric, often resurfacing 
in appellate court or new cases.
The poor quality of decisions produced by litigation can also be interpreted more 
generally as a consequence of handing difficult decisions over to an outsider to the dispute. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to letting an outsider make decisions. A position of 
relative neutrality can aiable one to evaluate and interpret disputes without the limiting bias 
of having a stake in the outcome, but it can also impede a full understanding of what is at 
stake for the several disputants. Such a decision-maker may not understand the situation 
well enough to gauge the consequences of possible decisions accurately. Stakeholders 
themselves are in a much better position from which to judge whether a decision is 
satisfactory and what consequences it is likely to generate. At the same time, it is also
20 Bacow and Wheeler (1984).
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possible that an outsider will not be neutral. These considerations suggest that disputants 
would do well to try working things out for themselves before turning the decision over to 
others.
An additional problem with litigation, which has perhaps generated the most interest 
in alternatives, is the notorious backlog of cases in the nation's court system. Part of this 
has resulted from litigation's ineffectiveness in resolving disputes. Because people are 
frequently unsatisfied with court decisions, the appellate courts have been overwhelmed. 
According to Warren Berger, the larger problem seems to be that, "the courts have been 
expected to fill the void created by the decline of church, family, and neighborhood 
unity."21 In other words, it appears that the courts serve as a replacement for other 
methods o f decision-making. Although this suggests that the former methods were 
somehow unsatisfactory, it is also possible that these have simply been lost as a result of 
being undermined by the relatively greater authority of court decisions. In the latter case, 
the courts are turned to for lack of alternatives. Berger's position is that in many cases the 
courts are a poor substitute for the institutions they have r e p la c e d .2 2  For reasons similar to 
those given above — namely, the narrow bases of court decisions — alternative methods of 
decision making are more appropriate fOT many disputes.
The inclusion o f litigation and legislation as alternatives helps rationalize and 
contextualize the other methods. It causes them to be characterized as alternatives, or valid 
substitutions, for more structured institutionalized procedures. Dispute resolution theory 
and practice is primarily concerned with alternatives to litigation and other conventional 
political p r o c e d u r e s .2 3  The other standard alternatives — arbitration, negotiation and
21 Berger (1982), p. 2.
22 This was echoed with a twist in a statement by Chief Justice Reinquist in February 1992 
(National Public Radio Segment). Reinquist announced that the judicial system is being 
abused, suggesting that appellants are to blame.
23 The synonym "alternative dispute resolution" expresses this more eloquently.
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mediation — can also be criticized for various shortcomings. The choice between 
alternatives is not black and white. Each process has strengths and weaknesses that make it 
more or less suited for specific disputes. Arbitration, for example, is an adversarial 
process, but still has some advantages over litigation. It is less expensive than litigation and 
arbitrators have more flexibility than judges to consider underlying issues. It also allows 
for confidentiality and selection of the arbitrator by disputants.^^ For these reasons it is 
often recommended as an alternative to litigation.
Arbitration, however, also shares many of the shortcomings of litigation. There is 
no guarantee that underlying issues will be represented by disputants or addressed by the 
arbitrator. Although arbitrators are not as constrained by narrow legal issues, adversarial 
positioning and personal biases may stiU obstruct a full exploration of disputed issues and 
the more informed decisions that could result from this. Moreover, confidentiality and 
selection of the arbitrator can cut both ways in environmental disputes. Confidentiality is 
good when it provides an atmosphere in which people are willing to talk more openly, but 
it can also be used to cover up information that more people should be aware of; for 
example, contamination of a watershed. Similarly, selection o f an arbitrator can be 
advantageous if it means providing someone who understands environmental science, but it 
can just as easily allow the selection of an arbitrator whose values and priorities are partial 
to one of the parties, possibly to the detriment of biological communities. Also, since the 
decision is made by the arbitrator, disputants may not take ownership of decisions with 
which they are not satisfied.
In contrast, negotiation and mediation share the advantages of arbitration, but allow 
disputants to participate directly in the decision-making process. Because decisions reflect 
agreements rather than third party rulings, disputants are more likely to take ownership of
24 Berger (1982), pp. 5 - 6 .
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them. Direct participation also provides an opportunity for underlying issues to come to the 
surface. At the same time, however, participation can be very time consuming and may not 
be cooperative. Adversarial bargaining strategies are frequently embraced as the key to 
success in negotiated decisions. Exaggerated demands, disruptive bargaining strategies, 
and even threats can be used to manipulate the process in one's own favor. The frequently 
competitive nature of negotiations often leads to decisions in which one party gains at the 
expense of another. The shortcomings of adversarial negotiations have generated 
considerable academic and professional interest in the problem of how to get competing 
negotiators to cooperate.^^
When the parties in negotiation or mediation collaborate, there is an opportunity to 
define issues more clearly by casting off obfuscating strategies. They may then undertake 
to explore alternative solutions that would satisfy the needs of all. But although this sounds 
ideal, there are still shortcomings. These are basic problems of democracy. There is no 
guarantee that the decision agreed upon is really the best decision possible. With respect to 
environmental conflicts this may be due to a lack of expert knowledge, or a lack of concern 
for the common good or the community at large. Such deficiencies may lead to agreements 
that just won't work in the long run, or that do work, but only at the expense of others not 
included in the p ro c e s s .2 6  And again, collaboration may never be achieved.
More Stalemate. The need for collaborative decision-making procedures is also 
based on the growing frequency with which entrenched disputes are preventing plans and 
policies from being implemented. Here the major focus is on resource agencies, public
25 Andes (1985), p. 17.
26 This was a basic problem in the Lolo Accords attempted mediation; key interest groups 
were unrepresented at the table and eventually opposed the agreement.
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decision-making, and the problems that stem from the political stalemates that bring these 
agencies to a halt.
Susskind and Cruikshank rationalize collaborative methods by arguing that many 
standard institutions of our political system are poorly adapted to solving many disputes. 
To substantiate this, they point to the familiar paralysis of the public sector; nothing getting 
done because the available channels to appeal and overturn decisions are being exploited 
very effectively by parties that aren't satisfied by public decisions. This is attributed to five 
basic flaws of our political system that "foster and prolong" disputes; tyranny of the 
majority, short-term political commitment, the inadequacies of the voting process, today’s 
technical complexities, and the emphasis on winner-takes-all solutions.^^ In general, these 
tend to produce "all or nothing" decisions which are based more on popular slogans than 
understanding of complex issues, and tend to silence and ignore legitimate minority claims. 
At the same time, channels for appeal often allow minorities to obstruct implementation of 
the decisions that offend them.
These criticisms are echoed in more abstract terms by Kenneth Barber, who 
critiques liberalism via the metaphor o f Newtonian physics. Barber describes a "Newtonian 
politics" based on assumptions about human nature that inform a particulate model of 
human interaction.^^ The resulting picture of atomic individuals bouncing blindly into one 
another according to physical laws of self-interest is a representation of the chaotic method 
of decision-making. Barber suggests that the shortcomings of our political institutions can 
be traced to the narrow and limiting mechanistic understanding of the political species on 
which they are based. Rather than understanding humans as communal, social creatures 
living in the midst o f relationships and interdependence, prevailing theories have described
27 Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), pp. 38 - 39.
28 Barber, Kenneth (1984).
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us as discrete individuals prone to conflict and dependent on coercive central authority to 
keep the peace.^9 Resulting institutions based on the rights of individuals reinforce and 
legitimate this characterization and treat disputes as contests between individuals. 
Collaboration, meanwhile, is often precluded as something which is beyond our abilities. 
Barber suggests that we need a community oriented understanding of ourselves in order to 
arrive at a community oriented politics, or one that looks to the common good and seeks 
consensus.
In general, the idea of the common good, or the good of the community, separates 
collaborative from adversarial alternatives. Reaching agreements which include and 
reconcile the interests o f many disputants allows decisions to be made in common. 
Procedures that have this goal imply that the political species is capable o f sorting out 
individual differences and making decisions as interactive and interdependent members of a 
community. By these means, minorities and the weaker-positioned in general can be 
included in decision-making rather than sacrificed for political expediency. At the same 
time, the communal quality of interdependence is not limited to human communities, but 
also describes ecological com munities. By reinforcing awareness o f human 
interdependence, collaborative practices may also remind us o f our place in a larger, 
interactive community.
Tragedy o f  the Commons. Concern for the common good is critical in the 
collective use o f any limited resource. The general paradigm of these situations is the 
problem set out by Garrett Hardin as the "tragedy of the com mons."^ The tragedy occurs 
when a resource, such as a grazing field or even a library, is shared by a number of people
29 Hobbes comes to mind here as providing the seminal description of the human potential 
without coercive authority — life would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short!
30 Hardin (1968), pp. 1243 - 1248. The Tragedy of the Commons is a model of human 
behavior based on game theory and rational choice theories of sociology.
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who act on the basis of immediate self-interest If everyone follows the rule of self-interest, 
common property is invariably destroyed. Although Hardin used this model to argue for 
privatization, it can also be used as an argument against narrow self-interest.
In the case of an unregulated library, the tragedy occurs if everyone chooses to keep 
library books instead of returning them. If we consider self-interest in terms of access to 
books, then keeping a book is a positive value which involves no loss in access to the 
library's other books. If everyone reasons this way, the library will soon be gone. 
Similarly, in the case of a common grazing field, adding animals beyond the field's 
capacity detracts from the value of every animal in the field. But since this decrease in value 
is spread out over the entire herd, the individual who adds more animals still comes out 
ahead.^i Since every stockowner on the commons has a similar a positive incentive to add 
to the herd, tragedy ensues because the limited resource is inevitably used up.
The tragedy of the commons is a model, or pattern, of a destructive situation. It 
demonstrates that exploitive values and limited resources do not mix well. It does not 
establish that self-interested values are right or wrong, but simply shows how they become 
self-destructive when resources are limited. Presuming that self-destruction is not the 
intended end, we could say that these values and their associated actions are poorly 
informed or shortsighted. On a shrinking planet where self-interest is the prevailing 
philosophy, shortsightedness is not the cutting edge of survival, but the cutting off of 
survival. Instead, we need to be aware of our interdependence and its consequences.
That is, supposing that 10 stock growers with 10 head apiece share a field that has the 
capacity to support 100 head, then all of the animals grow to their full size and bring the 
maximum price when sold. If one stockgrower doubles his herd, we then have 110 animals 
on a field that only supports 100. As a result, each animals food supply and weight is 
reduced by about a tenth, and their value drops accordingly. Thus overgrazing reduces the 
value of each animal. The guy with 20 head stiU comes out ahead though, since twenty 
times the reduced value is greater than ten times the fuU value.
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This paradigm applies to other common resources such as public lands, air and 
water with similar consequences. Its key assumption is that people will act in accordance 
with rational self-interest. The tragedy can be avoided if an understanding of the problem 
posed by many self-interests leads to a different perception of self-interest and a change in 
b e h a v i o r . ^ 2  incidentally, considering the consequences of many self-interests is similar to 
Kant's mechanistic approach to morality. He argues that one should only will such actions 
that could be willed universally. Thus the logical step that can avert the tragedy is not 
foreign to the culture of mechanistic science. By recognizing the limitations inherent in the 
system and universalizing immediate self-interest, the tragedy can be foreseen and so 
avoided.
This method of respecting the common good, however, is problematic insofar as it 
circumvents interaction. This is a quality of rational choice theories in general, which 
inform both Hardin's and Kant's formulas. In general, these theories rest on postulates of 
human motivation. The tragedy of the commons model, like our liberal institutions, is 
based on the postulate that humans are motivated by narrow self-interest. The model just 
applies this to a given situation and extrapolates the consequences. Ultimately, this reveals 
more about the consequences o f a certain set o f assumptions than it addresses real 
situations. Postulating that humans are motivated by narrow self-interest asserts that certain 
values are universal. This is a big assumption, and one which contradicts an alternative 
assumption that people and situations are unique.
Collaborative methods of decision-making are recommended by concern for the 
commons. The degradation o f the waterways in Upper Clark Fork Basin is a prime 
example of what can happen when narrow interests take precedence over concern for the 
larger systems and communities within which they are pursued. The question is how to
32 The problem is also avoided, or at least obscured, if people do not act rationally.
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resolve opposing interpretations of what is in the community's interest. This involves 
reconciling the differences between individual values and priorities.^^ While assuming that 
some values are universal would simplify these differences, it does so by burying them 
under an assumption. In contrast, collaboration lets different individuals speak for 
themselves, allowing community interests to reflect those of its members, rather than 
rational assumptions.
The significance of value differences can be seen in the Upper Clark Fork dispute. 
Although ranchers and environmentalists may agree that the river is in bad shape, and even 
that irrigation contributes to this, the two groups evaluate these facts differently. The issue 
of what to do about the Basin’s fishery is not just a technical problem, but involves a 
conflict of interests, or values. When disagreements are of this nature, it is unlikely that any 
method o f problem-solving that circumvents direct interaction will come up with real 
solutions. It is doubtful that anyone can represent the priorities, values and attitudes of 
another person as well as the unique individual that they belong to. In view of this, it 
makes sense that community members should represent themselves and engage in a 
dialogue that will enable them to understand and reconcile their own differences.
Ultimately, the commons becomes threatened because we ignore it; we ignore our 
interdependence. The problem is not that we fail to subscribe to Kantian or Hardinian 
formulas. Because formulas and rationalized systems constructed on this basis do little to 
restore attention to our surroundings, their contribution should not be overestimated. The 
cultural values and institutions that encourage us to think of ourselves as discrete 
individuals, rugged or selfish, distract us from thinking of what we share and hold in 
common. This suggests that we need institutions that recognize our interdependence and
33 Bacow and Wheeler (1984), p. 10.
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draw attention to our mutual dependence on the landscape we share. Collaborative methods 
of decision-making have this potential.
Such approaches could also help resolve environmental conflicts not directly 
described by the logic of the commons. This includes occasions when community decision­
making is complicated by property rights and dispositions favoring economic growth. 
Repeatedly we hear the argument that people need jobs and communities need economic 
development, often of the extractive industrial kind. But however persuasive, it is not true 
that industrial development is good without qualification.^'^ In actuality, it  can produce a 
myriad o f unanticipated problems. A sudden increase in population, increases in inflation 
and a greater demand for public services are examples o f the changes development brings 
to a rapidly growing community.^^ This indicates that the community would be wise to 
consider more than money when choosing to undertake industrial development and its 
consequences. Supposing that developers will be disproportionately influenced by potential 
profits, broadening the basis o f such decisions would seem to hinge on broadening 
community involvement in making them.
It is clear that economic development reaches beyond the developer and affects the 
entire community. From this standpoint it seems obvious that the entire community should 
participate in the question o f whether and how to undertake and manage such development 
This, however, is rare. The sanctified institution o f private property effectively obscures 
this common sense in most instances. Even when a local zoning process provides an 
opportunity for some involvement, input seldom goes beyond the concerns o f immediate 
neighbors and yea or nay opinions. Citizens who offer lengthier analyses of these 
questions are rare, and hearings often do little more than testify to the demand for job
Thomas Power’s book, TTte Economic Pursuit o f  Quality, discusses this in more detail. 
This is illustrated elegantly in the film. Heartland, produced by Northern Plains 
Resource Council.
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availability. Meanwhile, there are often ways to avoid zoning restrictions if a developer is 
determined to go through with a p r o j e c t .^ ^  Developing beyond city limits on private land, 
is one way to avoid the concerns of other local citizens,^^
In many places there appears to be a lack of concern for whole communities and 
lack of respect between the individuals who share them. More precisely, we often do not 
"share" them at all, but simply take what we can get. The consequences of this on our 
neighbors is their problem. It is up to them to compete in turn to get what they can. 
Whoever gets the most wins! This goes for human communities as well as the larger 
ecological communities. Unfortunately, this prevailing attitude will make us all losers in the 
long run. On the one hand it allows the human community to become a place o f winners 
and losers, o f haves and have-nots, which can generate despair and violence; the brutality 
of the philosophy may be reproduced with a vengeance by the disadvantaged. At the same 
time, the existing stock of stuff to compete for is bound to run out. In other words, the 
resource base is used up, degraded, destroyed.
Natural Selection. Squinting back into the misty could-be's of primordial 
human society, there is room to speculate fruitfully on the role of collaboration in our 
development as a social species. Employing a basic Darwinian-Mendelian view of 
evolution based on natural selection, it is possible that under the right natural conditions, 
successful means o f resolving conflict have been a boon to human communities. Group 
hunting methods, for example, which were virtually necessary for hunting massive game 
like mammoth or bison, required humans to work together. Speculating still further, it is 
possible that our use of language developed as a way to reduce conflict by establishing
^  Landman ( 1985) discusses this with regard to the ineffectiveness of Montana's 
subdivision law.
In some cases, county restrictions prevent this; eg, Ross Electric's effort to build a toxic 
waste incinerator outside the city limits of Missoula, MT, was stopped by a county 
prohibition of waste burning throughout the larger Missoula Valley.
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agreements. Communication can contribute to the coordination of a group, or its ability to 
work together.
While this is mere speculation, the accuracy of which is ultimately hidden in the 
mists o f unrecorded history, it is a relevant analogy to our modern environmental and 
evolutionary crises, both local and worldwide. The current rate of environmental 
degradation and species loss is threatening the biosphere and the future survival o f species, 
possibly including ourselves. This is a situation where successful collaboration could be an 
evolutionary advantage. In other words, it may be time to remember communal origins and 
the wisdom of ancestors.
Numerous actions that could be taken to relieve these crises are impeded by 
environmental and development conflicts around the world. From the international level to 
the local level, entrenched disputes are preventing critical solutions from coming forth. The 
causes of these disputes are very complex and case specific, but they are similar as 
stalemates. Their entrenched characteristic stands in the way o f settlement and solutions. 
Supposing that the doom and gloom crowd is right — that our large-scale modelling efforts 
are in the right ball park in indicating that time is running out if we intend to keep this planet 
inhabitable — something needs to be done soon. In this light, the continued evolution of our 
species and cultures and the other remaining species on the planet is a rationale for dispute 
resolution.
Much o f this comes down to an assessment of risk and our willingness to 
compromise in order to avert disaster. There are valid concerns on both sides here as to the 
need for compromise. On the one hand, development advocates may not be persuaded that 
the biosphere or even any o f its subsystems are really threatened. In this case, compromise 
suggests throwing away profits and power to satisfy a bunch of evangelistic humanists and 
eco-granolas. On the other hand, many environmental advocates feel that the biosphere has
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already suffered too much and that compromise means continuing the damage, but only at a 
slightly slower rate. In this case, degradation will continue as new agreements succeed only 
in delaying somewhat our immanent self-destruction. The value of collaboration and the 
possibility of mutually beneficial compromise is contested on both sides.
While there is no guarantee that negotiated solutions to these conflicts will work, or 
even if they do manage to produce agreements, that these will avert our self-destruction, it 
still stands to reason that an endless standoff solves nothing. Despite the lack of 
guarantees, it stands to reason that beginning to talk about our differences and 
understanding one another's needs and the needs of the planet is a first step towards 
figuring out what to do. Communication is our best hope at reaching agreements that will 
get us through these crises.
Given the shortcomings of conventional decision-making procedures, it makes 
sense to seek alternatives. Given the community stake in landscape decisions, it makes 
sense to seek community-oriented alternatives that rqplace discrete interests with interactive 
agreements. As local landscapes and the earth's biosphere are being destroyed, indecision 
serves no one.
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III. Collaboration
If we're ever going to quit reliving that story we have to start talking 
things out, searching for accord, however difficult and long-winded the 
undertaking. We need to see that adversarial, winner-take-all, showdown 
political decision-making is a way we defeat ourselves. Our future starts 
when we begin honoring the dreams of our enemies while staying true to
our own.38
-William Kittredge, 1992
The assertion that collaborative methods o f decision-making offer a viable alter­
native to adversarial struggles and entrenched disputes requires substantiation. Disputants 
who are frustrated with adversarial procedures and feel that they are accomplishing very 
little may well agree that there ought to be a better way to make decisions. But unless this 
better way is understood and accessible, disputants have little choice but to persevere with 
their struggles. It is fine to point out problems with adversarial attitudes and non-decision, 
but until an alternative is offered, such criticism lacks the force to bring ^aout change. This 
chapter describes collaborative procedures and considers how they are being implemented 
in Upper Clark Fork Basin.
Collaborative Methods. Collaborative methods have been introduced as a 
community-oriented approach to decision-making — a way to transform discrete and 
conflicting interests into an agreed-upon estimate of the common good. Where cultural 
values and institutions are adversarial, however, collaboration can be difficult to 
implement In Upper Clark Fork Basin, individualism has strong roots in the Western 
mythos of rugged independence and in institutions such as property rights and watCT rights. 
As noted earlier, transformation of the landscape has come about in a predominantly chaotic 
manner and has led to adversarial disputes. This history supports and validates an
38 Kittredge (1992); p. 12.
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adversarial orientation to dispute settlement. As a result, efforts to get disputants to 
collaborate must often overcome this adversarial orientation.
Getting away from adversarial struggles can be a formidable task, especially when 
disputes are entrenched and impassioned. When embroiled in conflict, the political species 
often becomes suspicious and defensive. At such times, even the most well-intended 
efforts to promote cooperation can be seen as malicious attempts to build trust that wÜl only 
be taken advantage of later. Under these conditions, collaboration seems unlikely. It may 
yet be fostered, however, with the aid of dispute resolution theory and practice.
Formalized collaborative procedures can be thought o f as tools for moving 
adversarial disputants toward more collaborative problem solving relationships. A variety 
o f frameworks and model procedures are available, enabling would-be collaborators to 
select whichever is best suited to a specific dispute. Because disputes are context specific 
and vary in many respects, there is no simple formula for resolving them. The various 
collaborative models are processes that can be introduced and followed in specific 
situations. They provide series of procedural steps that can be taken to move away from 
adversarial struggle toward agreement.
In Getting to Yes, Roger Fisher and William Ury present a form o f negotiation 
called "principled negotiation," or "negotiation on the merits." This approach to 
collaboration is based on an analysis of positional bargaining, in which disputants take hard 
or soft bargaining strategies to get what they want. According to the authors, the problem 
with positional bargaining is twofold. On the one hand, when hard positions are taken, 
adversarial stalemates develop. These are struggles to dominate, or gain the upper position. 
But on the other hand, if soft positions are taken, the quality of agreements tends to suffer. 
Soft positions are oriented toward reaching agreements and preserving cooperation at all 
costs. If  all disputants take soft positions, difficult issues may be glossed over or avoided
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entirely, possibly leaving them to erupt again later. Meanwhile, if disputants are divided 
between hard and soft positions, hard positions dominate.
Based on their analysis, Fisher and Ury suggest that every dispute has two aspects 
“  the relationship of the disputants and the substance of the dispute. Principled negotiation 
is based on recognizing both of these aspects and dealing with them separately. On the one 
hand, disputants are human beings with valid emotions. These can get tangled up with and 
obscure substantive issues. By airing these feelings and recognizing their validity, the 
authors maintain, the disputants can gain a new perspective that enables them to address the 
substantive issues o f their dispute more objectively. Participants can "come to see 
themselves as working side by side, attacking the problem, not each other.
From this standpoint, the struggle to dominate develops and intensifies when 
adversaries identify themselves with their positions. Changing positions becomes a matter 
of self-sacrifice, or an unacceptable admission o f weakness or inferiority. Under these 
conditions, negotiation is reduced to a battle between wills, which effectively obstructs 
constructive problem solving.^! Fisher's and Ury's framework for dealing with this 
situation includes four general propositions, or rules; (1) separate the people from the 
problem, (2) focus on interests, not positions, (3) generate a variety of possibilities before 
deciding what to do, and (4) insist that the result be based on some objective standard. 
These rules are designed to help negotiators replace the battle o f wills with a reasoned 
discussion of interests, options and criteria.'*^
In general, this approach to collaboration seems both theoretically sound and easy 
to follow. Its simplicity, however, may be illusory. The four simple rules given here
39 Fisher and Ury (1981), pp. 3 - 14.
40 Ibid, p. 11.
41 Ibid, pp. 84 - 85.
42 Ibid, pp. 1 1 -1 4 .
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represent tasks that can be quite difficult to carry off in practice. Although a negotiator can 
try to follow these rules and recommend them to the other parties, adversarial attitudes may 
still prevail. Anticipating this, the authors offer some additional suggestions; namely, 
maintain a strong position by developing alternatives to reaching agreement, refuse to fall 
back into positioning no matter what the others do^^, and try to lay down ground rules at 
the beginning of the negotiation.*^ Although collaboration may still be difficult to achieve 
depending on the particulars of a  dispute and its disputants, these rules and suggestions 
provide an idea of how to proceed. Together with the analysis on which they are based, 
these precepts constitute a loose framework for understanding and changing the dynamics 
of adversarial situations.
Susskind and Cruikshank provide a somewhat different framework. They present a 
spectrum of collaborative methods which vary according to the degree o f outside 
intervention, or procedural assistance, that they entail. The range of alternatives includes 
unassisted negotiation and several shades o f assisted negotiation — facilitation, mediation, 
and less common procedures, such as mock trials.*^  ̂Each of these methods is described as 
involving a similar series o f procedural steps. The methods vary in terms of how much 
assistance is provided to help disputants keep in step.
In unassisted negotiation, as one might expect, disputants must take these steps for 
themselves. Fisher and Ury's ftamework provides one way they might do this. In contrast, 
Susskind and Cruikshank present a time sequence o f steps to follow in order to arrive at 
consensus. Where Fisher and Ury dealt only with negotiation, these authors address a 
larger process which they divide into three phases — prenegotiation, negotiation, and 
postnegotiation.
^3 "Negotiation Jujitsu"
44 Fisher and Ury (1981), pp. 101 - 149.
45 Susskind and Cruikshank (1987). Chapters 4 and 5 discuss these in detail.
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Prenegotiation includes four steps — making contacts and learning about the 
dispute, determining who should participate and getting them or their representatives to the 
table, developing ground rules and an agenda, and engaging participants in joint fact­
finding in order to generate a common basis o f knowledge from which to negotiate. The 
inclusion o f ground rules and joint fact-finding in the prenegotiation phase suggests that 
these steps are to be approached as technical matters to be settled prior to bargaining. This 
is a notable divergence from Fishe* and Ury, who treated these steps as part of negotiation. 
By framing these steps as part of prenegotiation, Susskind and Cruikshank may help to 
isolate them from from the throes of positioning. That is, this conceptual framework seems 
to encourage disputants to engage in developing ground rules and fact-finding in a more 
business-like, or principled manner than they might otherwise. This may allow critical parts 
of the negotiation, its rules and foundation, to be developed with a minimum of conflict.
The negotiation phase begins by inventing options for mutual gain. These are then 
packaged, or combined, into agreements that are acceptable to all parties. This sequence 
adheres to the rule of generating options before deciding what to do. While negotiation 
might be expected to end once an z^reement is reached, Susskind and Cruikshank include 
three more steps — producing a written agreement, developing provisions that will ensure 
the parties’ accountability to the agreement, and ratification of agreements by represented 
groups. These additional steps help ensure that hard-won agreements will both last long 
enough and have the support to be implemented. Postnegotiation follows up on this by 
formalizing agreements, monitoring implementation, and providing for renegotiation in the 
event that unforeseen circumstances should make this necessary or desirable.
In general, this series o f steps provides a considerably different framework for 
problem solving than Fisher's and Ury’s general rules. The step-by-step approach is more 
structured. It also draws attention to the process of consensus building by defining it more
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exactly. Fisher and Ury were more concerned with qualities of negotiation than providing a 
detailed analysis of the collaborative process. In contrast, Susskind and Cruikshank appear 
to be more concerned with clarifying and designing an orderly and comprehensive process 
than encouraging their readers to speculate on the root causes of adversarial behavior. 
IntCTestingly, this may help separate the people from the problem. That is, by focussing on 
process rather than ego warfare, we are less inclined to view adversaries within an us-and- 
them framework. When it comes time to p^suade disputants that collaboration is worth a 
try, the merits of a process may be easier for them to appreciate than the propriety of 
individual attitudes and behavior.
While unassisted negotiation leaves disputants to follow these steps on their own, a 
facilitator can provide them with limited assistance. According to Susskind and 
Cruikshank, a "facilitator" is an intervener whose influence on the negotiation is limited to 
procedural matters, such as proposing ground rules and keeping the discussion in line with 
agendas. These authors distinguish procedural considerations from substantive issues 
much as Fisher and Ury distinguished relationships from the substance of disputes. The 
issue of how to proceed is largely a matter o f structuring and guiding the interaction of 
disputants to render it as constructive as possible. In other words, a facilitator manipulates 
the disputants' relationship in order to keep them focussed on solving the problem rather 
than taking hard positions or wandering off on tangents.
In mediation, meanwhile, the intervener influences both substantive and procedural 
matters. This becomes desirable when procedural intervention alone is not enough to 
generate agreements. When disputants are too entrenched in their positions to communicate 
constructively, a mediator can sometimes act as a go between. By discussing issues with 
the various parties separately, a mediator may be able to identify options and develop 
mutually beneficial packages. These can then be proposed to the disputants and modified
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until an agreement is reached. By making proposals and developing options, the mediator 
is influencing substantive issues as well as the process.
More innovative methods are also available. Mock trials are basically just what they 
sound like. By simulating a trial, disputants can sometimes get a better understanding of the 
relative strength of their positions while at the same time generating possible solutions. The 
mock decisions generated in such trials are potential solutions to the dispute, which can be 
accepted or rejected by the participants. Another innovative method, proposed elsewhere by 
William Fulton, is "design-oriented negotiation."*^^ This is an approach to land-use 
planning that makes use o f extreme project designs to literally illustrate the 
unreasonableness of some positions. A neutral designer-facilitator helps the disputants 
agree on some basic parameters of the project design and then takes these and develops 
several alternative extreme interpretations of the requirements. Once illustrated, extreme 
positions become harder to defend, making mutually agreeable alternatives easier to 
identify.
It is noteworthy that Susskind and Cruikshank differentiate collaborative methods 
according to the degree o f assistance or intervention that they afford negotiators. The 
degree of outside intervention is emphasized because of its influence on whether disputants 
are willing to take ownership o f decisions. Ownership of decisions hinges on whether 
decisions are accepted voluntarily or imposed by higher authorities and/or more powerful 
parties. Based on their analysis o f public disputes, the authors maintain that dissatisfaction 
with imposed decisions is a primary cause of prolonged public disputes. Dissatisfaction 
with decisions impedes ownership, without which parties may impede implementation to 
the best o f their abilities.^^ Avoiding this requires that decisions are mutually satisfactory
46 Fulton (1989).
47 Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), Chapter 3.
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and voluntarily accepted by all parties. This can be ensured by allowing participants to 
determine the content of decisions for themselves. Because intervention detracts from the 
disputants' influence on decisions, the best method to use in any situation is that which 
involves the least intervention.^*
Given this range o f collaborative methods, it appears that disputants have some 
options in addition to adversarial struggle. Step-by-step procedural frameworks and other 
conceptual guidelines bring collaboration closer to reality by helping us understand how it 
works and providing a starting point and a path to follow in the event that someone wants 
to give it a try."^  ̂ Although there is no guarantee that disputants will choose to try 
collaboration, elucidation o f these procedures at least provides them with a choice. But 
because the understanding afforded by frameworks and models is largely theoretical, many 
potential collaborators may not be persuaded that they really work. As long as these 
alternatives are left drifting in the realm o f abstract analysis, without concrete examples, 
their viability remains dubious. Experience is more persuasive than theoretical models. In 
view of this, there is reason to consider the practice o f collaboration in terms of its 
applicability to specific disputes.
The Committee. The Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee is 
attempting to resolve an entrenched dispute via collaboration. Because the Committee is still 
at an early stage of its endeavor to develop a comprehensive plan for the Basin’s 
waterways, it cannot serve as a demonstration of successful collaboration. It does, 
however, provide some examples of how theories of collaboration translate into the realm 
of practice.
Ibid, Chapter 5.
Other step-by-step approaches are laid out by McCarthy and Shorett (1984) in Nego­
tiating Settlements, and by Crowfoot and Wondolleck ( 1990) in Environmental Dispute 
Resolution. These are similar to those discussed, but offer some additional insights and 
suggestions on how to proceed.
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The Committee is an example of facilitation. Although DNRC is responsible for 
coordinating basin committees under the State Water Plan, the facilitation of this committee 
is being paid for and implemented by a private, non-profit organization; Northern Lights 
Research and Education Institute, located in Missoula. This organization also sponsored the 
formation and facilitation of the group that preceded this Committee. The Clark Fork River 
Project was undertaken in 1988 when Northern Lights "formed a steering committee 
including representatives of the range of stakeholders in the use and management of the 
river.
In June 1990, this group decided to narrow their focus and form a Water Allocation
Task Force consisting of representatives of agricultural, recreational, and environmental
organizations, hydroelectric utilities, state agencies, and local government. The Task Force
soon became entangled in the tension surrounding the two water reservation applications,
and eventually lobbied the legislature to enact a moratorium on issuing water rights and
reservations until a comprehensive plan could be developed. According to the summary of
a presentation at the present Committee's first meeting;
The members of the Task Force were faced with expense, conflict and risk 
arising from a pending contested case water reservation hearing before the 
Board o f Natural Resources and Conservation. Although they shared 
suspicion and skepticism about doing so, the Task Force decided to attempt 
negotiations which might eliminate the need for the hearing. Negotiations 
occurred during December 1990 through February 1991, and an agreement, 
entitled the Upper Clark Fork River Agreement, was signed in late 
February.^ 1
This Agreement provided the prototype for Senate Bill 434, which created the Upper Clark 
Fork River Basin Steering Committee. The success o f the Task Force negotiation is an
Northern Lights, "Upper Clark Fork Steering Committee October 28,1991 Meeting 
Summary," p. 2.
Ibid, p. 2.
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important source of confidence in the ability o f the new Committee to sort out the 
reservation dispute and develop a Basin plan on which all o f its members can agree.
Facilitation. As noted, the facilitation of the Committee is being funded privately. 
The idea of privately funding a state project may seem unusual or even wrong. But when 
the responsible agency is not a neutral party, this is recommended by a consideration of the 
role o f trust and fairness in the dynamics of successful negotiation. In this case, the 
responsible agency is DNRC.
DNRC oversees water rights and use permits within the Basin and so is in a 
position o f authority and control with respect to the Basin’s water users. From the 
standpoint of many water users, DNRC is an obstacle to their interests. The principles, 
concerns, and interests that guide DNRC in its management decisions sometimes come into 
conflict with the interests o f water users. Such conflicts demonstrate that DNRC is not a 
neutral party with respect to the use and management of water within the Basin. Despite the 
legal basis o f DNRC’s authority and guidelines, these still constitute an interest in the 
Basin's waters. Concern for the possibility that these interests could dominate the planning 
committee’s decisions unfairly if DNRC held the purse strings is reason to find outside 
funding, or at least set up the fund in such a way that it is isolated from the agency’s 
influence.
In addition, the possibility o f political affiliations between various agencies and 
interests at the state capitol may arouse suspicion regarding the integrity, or "legal purity," 
of DNRC's interpretation and implementation of its duties within the Basin. State capitols 
develop their own political cultures distinguished by local knowledge o f the state’s 
channels of political influence. Although some Basin dwellers participate in this in varying 
degrees, there is a cultural separation between the Basin and the capitol which can give rise 
to distrust, especially on the part o f those with less influence. It is not terribly hard to
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imagine political influence being abused. Regardless o f whether such distrust, or 
suspicion, is well-placed, it may enhance the impression that DNRC should not be trusted 
to facilitate neutrally. Judging from casual conversation with some ranchers and water 
users in the Philipsburg area, distrust is ju s t the best way to deal with government 
authority, whether this means DNRC, FWP, the Forest Service, or the 1RS. Although the 
prevalence of this attitude throughout the Basin is uncertain, its possibility is an additional 
reason for outside facilitation and funding. Being able to trust the facilitator is a critical 
element of successful facilitation; without this, participants are liable to reject decisions and 
ap^ly themselves to obstruction rather than implementation.
The basin committee's facilitator also facilitated Northern Lights' Clark Fork 
Project and the subsequent Task Force. Perhaps because Northern Lights has the reputation 
o f being an "environmental organization," there has been some resistance to this facilitator 
within the Committee. Some members seem to feel that the facilitator may be biased on 
behalf of environmental protection and Committee members who advocate such protection. 
This manifests itself from time to time, especially when procedural issues are brought up 
for the Committee's consideration. In the third meeting, for example, when Committee 
ground rules were being considered, a membCT objected to the following proposed rule:
Meetings of the Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee will be
scheduled by the Committee Facilitator pursuant to the Committee's work
plan or the call o f a quorum of Committee members.^^
The member expressed concern for the range of what might be done in the name of the 
"work plan," telling the facilitator that the rule "seems to give you broad powers."^^ 
Apparently, this member felt that the vaguen^s of this language might be taken advantage
52 Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee, Ground Rules (January 28, 1992).
53 Bradford, S.; Transcripts of Upper Clark Fork Basin Committee, Meeting #3 (January 
30, 1992).
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of by the facilitator. The rule was modified to specify the Committee's "approved work 
plan."
A short time later, at the same meeting, the same member objected to the fact that
the frequency of Committee meetings was not specified in the Ground Rules, arguing that
meetings could become a burden on "those who aren't paid to be here." Whether this was
meant to single out the facilitator is uncertain. In general, however, agency and company
representatives, as well as the facilitator, attend the meetings as part of their jobs, while
self-employed ranchers must take time off in order to attend. This division suggests that the
objection was motivated partly by concern that frequent meetings might be used to bias the
Committee's decisions in favor o f paid members. The objection was discussed and
everyone agreed that frequency of meetings should be kept flexible but not allowed to
become burdensome. No changes in the Ground Rules were m a d e .54
At the end of the Committee's fifth meeting, a similar attitude of distrust came out in
response to the procedural issue of how to pay for continued facilitation. This came up
because the foundation that sponsored Northern Lights' facilitation of the Clark Fork
Project and the Task Force, decided not to fund the present Committee on grounds that,
since it now has political support within the state, private funding is no longer needed.55
According to DNRC’s minutes of the meeting;
(The facilitator) asked the Committee's approval for Northern Lights to seek 
money for their future participation. (A member) explained that he would 
just as soon see Northern Lights' participation stop. He had some concerns 
regarding Washington Water Power funding the process, and would like to 
see where the past money has been spent, and travel funding for committee
members.56
54 Ibid.
55 Committee expenses, including the facilitator, currently lack funding.
55 DNRC, "Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee Minutes - April 15, 1992," 
p. 14.
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In this case, the member's opposition to Northern Lights is expressed unambiguously. He 
also suggests that money has been misspent. Both expressions indicate distrust of Northern 
Lights and the facilitator. When questioned by other committee members as to the causes of 
his suspicion, the member declined to explain. The Committee then voted to support 
Northern Lights' continued facilitation and quest for funding — no one voted against 
this.^^
Regarding the first two examples, it seems important to observe that the objections 
do reflect genuine ambiguities in the text of the Ground Rules. The vagueness o f "work 
plan" and the lack of specificity regarding the frequency o f meetings, could provide an 
opportunity for someone with devious intentions to manipulate the rules to his or her own 
advantage. The possibility o f funds being misused when no one is watching is also 
feasible. Given the central role and responsibilities of the facilitator, this position would 
seem to be the best from which to manipulate the process. Such are the calculations of a 
suspicious mind; again, it is not terribly hard to imagine power being abused.
In this case, however, the suspicion seems unwarranted. The vast majority of 
committee members on both sides seem to have developed a working respect for the 
facilitator's integrity as a neutral participant. Eight members of the Committee also 
participated in the Task Force, which explicitly requested that this facilitator be appointed to 
guide the Basin Committee.^* The Task Force's success in reaching an agreement speaks 
strongly for his competence, while in the meantime, he has done nothing in the context of 
the Committee to suggest that he cannot be trusted. In view o f this, the apparent distrust 
seems to have more to do with preconceived notions than experience. Although some 
members' limited acquaintance with the facilitator and Northern Lights helps explain this.
57 Ibid.
58 Northern Lights, "Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee, October 28, 
1991 Meeting Summary."
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the insinuations seem ungrounded and disruptive in view of the facilitator’s demonstrated 
character.
In the absence o f trust, a facilitator's success depends primarily on whether 
disputants have sufficient reason or motivation to want an agreement. The decision to 
negotiate is usually informed by substantial costs or risks involved in pursuing other 
courses o f  action. Fisher and Ury deal at some length with the concept of a negotiator's 
BATNA — the Best Alternative To a Negotiated A g r e e m e n t . T h e  strength o f a 
negotiator’s position depends largely on his or her alternatives to negotiation. The more 
dependent one is on reaching an agreement, the more likely one is to cooperate. When the 
alternatives do not look terribly promising, negotiation starts to look good. In such 
situations, agreements can sometimes be reached despite a lack of trust. This is another 
important dynamic of the Basin Committee facilitation.
In this case, the willingness o f the primary disputants to attempt negotiation can be 
understood as a consequence of risks involved in letting the Board of Natural Resources 
and Conservation (BNRC) decide their fate. These members seem to be realizing their 
mutual dependence in getting what they need. On the one hand, the instream flow 
reservation applied for by the Department o f Fish, Wildlife and Parks (FWP) might be 
granted by BNRC. The final EIS supports this application.^ But without the cooperation 
o f ranchers, FWP could encounter serious obstacles to enforcing the reservation's 
implementation. The Basin is just too big to monitor every diversion to make sure water 
stays in the streams. Meanwhile, Granite County Conservation District and the water users 
who would benefit from their reservation application are also in a situation where 
cooperation may be their best option.
Fisher and Ury (1981), pp. 104 -111.
^  DNRC (1991), Final Environmental Im p ^ t Statement fo r  Water Reservation 
Applications in the Upper Clark Fork Basin, pp. 9 -1 6 .
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Ranchers are coming up against economic changes that are affecting the status of 
irrigation as a beneficial water use. Historically, agricultural diversions have been the 
number one beneficial use of water in the West, but this is now changing. Hydropower and 
recreation are becoming more important by virtue of their greater economic benefits.^* 
Because o f this, irrigation is less likely to be favored by BNRC than it would have been in 
the past. The fact that the reservation would require the construction of two new reservoirs 
at an estimated cost of forty million dollars could also deter BNRCs supporL^^ Moreover, 
there is no legal basis on which to grant a water reservation to protect one beneficial use 
from competing uses. Even if BNRC decides to support these irrigators in their application, 
the decision may not hold up in court. Water reservations are granted on the basis of 
demonstrated need. In this case the "need" is to ensure the future development of additional 
irrigation within the Basin. This could be regarded as more of a preference than a need. 
Overall, there is some incentive for irrigators to consider the relative benefits of a negotiated 
agreement. Rather than chancing it with BNRC and possible litigation, the future of 
irrigation might fare better if  a collaborative relationship is established with the Basin's 
other water users.
The extent to which Committee members from the Basin's ranching community 
perceive themselves to need an agreement is difficult to gauge. Some members are constant 
advocates o f negotiation, while others tend to be disruptive. As an observer, my general 
impression is that many ranchers are feeling threatened by the changes happening around 
them and the resulting uncertainty that clouds their future. Their habitat is changing and 
could be lo st For some, this is cause to start making neighbors out of the hydropower 
giants that lurk downstream, while others are ready to fight. In general, these members are
High Country News (1987), pp. 101 - 102.
62 DNRC (1991), pp. 6 - 8. $40 million is DNRC's estimate. GCCD puts the cost near 
$17 million.
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divided in their commitment to collaboration. With regard to those who are not committed 
or compelled to reaching agreements, the integrity of the process and the facilitator is 
critical to the success of the negotiation and ownership of agreements.
Representation. The members of the Committee were selected by the director of 
Montana’s Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC). They include 
representatives of various water using groups and the governmental units that make 
decisions affecting them. Represented groups include irrigators, environmental groups, 
municipalities, hydropower and mining companies, county commissions, several state 
agencies and EPA. The Committee has twenty-one members in all, not counting the 
facilitator.
Because the central dispute involves the water reservation applications of GCD 
and FWP, the balance of representation between these two organizations is important. 
Although each of these organizations has only one representative, many other represented 
groups align more naturally with one than the other. In addition to GCD, the Committee 
includes several other members who are either irrigators themselves or friendly to them. 
These includes three ranchers from Powell and Silver Bow Counties; and representatives of 
Granite County Commission; Deer Lodge County Commission; Montana Water Resources 
Association; Headwaters RC&D. An additional member from Philipsburg is also likely to 
sympathize with these rural interests. Similarly, FWP's efforts to protect the Basin's 
fishery and improve water quality tend to be supported by Montana Trout Unlimited; Clark 
Fork Coalition; and the City o f Missoula. Hydropower producers, who are also supportive 
o f maximizing stream flow, include Montana Power Company and Washington Water 
Power Company. This makes it GCD 9, FWP 6.
For the remaining members, probable affiliations are somewhat less predictable. 
This includes representatives o f ARCO; EPA; DNRC; Montana Department of Health and
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Environmental Sciences (DHES); two members of the state’s Legislative Water Policy 
Committee; and two members of the State Water Planning Advisory Committee (SWPAC), 
Of these, the regulatory agencies — EPA, DNRC, and DHES — are generally perceived to 
favor conservation despite the neutrality of their public standing. This evens the score to 9 
all. In view of this, the group seems reasonably well-balanced. This adds to the integrity of 
the process, which would be compromised if one of two or more adversarial groups had 
overwhelming influence on the group's decisions.
Although the Committee is fairly broad based, the represented groups do not 
account for everyone with interests in the Basin's water. The membership includes only 
those groups whose involvement was considered essential to producing a plan that would 
have an adequate support base to be implemented. Some groups conspicuously absent from 
the Committee are the other municipalities, Montana Department of Agriculture, the Forest 
Service, and a group of concerned citizens/irrigators from the Upper Hint Creek area. This 
last group expressed a commitment to block the Committee if it interferes in any way with 
their federally granted water right.^^ other citizens also lack representation.
The decision to include some groups and not others can be rationalized as a 
pragmatic measure to limit the size of the Committee or insulate it from extreme parties who 
may not be willing to collaborate. It also raises suspicion, however, regarding whether the 
group has been "loaded" one way or another. Since the Director o f DNRC is primarily 
responsible for appointing members to the committee, groups having historically poor 
relations with DNRC can be expected to regard these omissions with some suspicion. 
DNRC's role as an interested party in the Basin's water conflicts contributes to this.
Some UppCT Flint Creek residents presented a letter and made a statement to this effect 
at the Committee’s second meeting (December 9,1991).
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Regardless of why the omissions have occurred, it is questionable whether a plan can really
be comprehensive if some interests are not represented.
The Committee has two options for addressing the limitations of its representation.
First, it can ask the director o f DNRC to appoint additional members. Second, it can
develop its own public participation program to encourage broader involvement.
Appointing new members is useful if the participation of a specific group is desired.
Supposing this is the case, the committee can recommend this to the Director of DNRC,
who may then appoint additional members on this basis. Although the Director, Karen
Barclay, has the option of not cooperating, this seems unlikely. According to her
introductory presentation at the first meeting,
groups that review and approve a basin m aniem ent plan would be unlikely 
to dictate plan provisions against the wishes of the local water users as 
represented by the steering committee.
Although this addresses the plan rather than a request for additional members, and re f^s to
groups rather than the director herself, one would expect that a similar policy would hold
with respect to the Committee's wishes regarding its own composition. From what can be
gleaned from the notes and transcripts, Ms. Barclay wants to see the committee succeed.
If higher decision making bodies overturn the plans o f basin committees, this stands to
alienate the committees from the government and obstruct the implementation of any plan.
The Committee has also spent some time considering how to involve more of the
public in its efforts. Several suggestions have been made, such as expanding the
Committee's mailing list, holding meetings throughout the Basin, issuing press releases,
surveying the public interest, and including a time for public comment at all meetings. Of
these, only press releases and a public comment period have materialized at this time. A
press release for the second meeting also encouraged broader involvement, quoting Senator
Tom Beck in saying;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6 2
I strongly urge the basin's farmers and ranchers, recreationists, cities and 
towns, businesses and industries, environmentalists — all of us interested in 
the management o f the Upper Clark Fork and its tributaries to become 
involved with the work of the Committee.^
In addition, there is considerable interest in varying the location o f meetings in order to
make more people aware of their happening and to make them more accessible to different
communities.
The difficulty of involving more people suggests that the Basin Committee is really 
not very representative of the Basin. It may be that most people are simply not interested in 
water management. Visiting Philipsburg in March, the staff at the Town Hall hadn’t heard 
of any basin plan and couldn't tell me anything about the water reservation issue except that 
it sounded like something the Flint Creek Water Users would know about. Since 
Philipsburg has its water supply pretty much taken care of by two lakes above the town, 
water use in the rest of the Basin, apparently, is not a major concern. At Granite County 
Court House, the response was about the same. One staff member knew that a Committee 
member was reporting to the County Commissioners, but that was all. He gave the 
impression that the Commissioners wanted to keep informed, but had no defined interest in 
the matter. At the Forest Service Ranger Station, no one knew anything about it.
Later on at the roadhouse, I did meet up with some ranchers who gave me radically 
divergent earfuls on what was going on. From the standpoint of one ranching family, 
CCD's reservation proposal was really just for the benefit o f more powerful ranchers 
downstream. As far as these folks were concerned, irrigation was hurting fish and 
overgrazing in the forests was hurting the hunting and driving elk to invade pastures. They 
portrayed themselves as some of the little guys who get walked on by the government and 
more powerful stakeholders. In contrast, from the standpoint of an irrigator, the claims that 
fish were being threatened were untrue and put forth as part of a political struggle between
^  Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee Press Release (December 6, 1991).
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FWP and the ranching community. He also didn't think that forty million dollars was too 
much o f a price tag for a project that would benefit a handful of ranching families.
In general, the difficulty o f involving more people in the basin committee's project 
seems to stem from several causes. Some people are not aware o f water issues or the 
Committee's ongoing task. Others are simply not interested. And some feel alienated from 
the govemment.^^ Whether the Committee can overcome such difficulties and get people 
interested and involved remains to be seen.
Interaction. The Committee has been described as providing a forum in which 
political discourse can come to complement political struggle. Its meetings are an 
opportunity for citizens with opposing interests in the Basin's waters and different 
perceptions of what is at stake to come together and interact in a constructive manner. 
Ideally, by exchanging information and expressing their different perspectives to one 
another, Committee members can reach agreements as to the Basin's problems and limits, 
which will in turn allow them to reach agreement on the best possible solutions for all 
concerned. By observing Committee meetings, one can gauge whether such constructive 
interaction is actually occurring. Transcripts of the dialogue at meetings also allow some 
insight into the qualities o f the members' interaction.
What follows is a segment of the Committee's conversation at an early meeting. 
This is included partly to allow readers who have not attended the Committee’s meetings to 
form their own interpretation o f  them and partly to provide a basis for my own 
interpretation of the meetings. Identification o f members has not been included, primarily 
due to concern for an ongoing process. Because this takes the language out of context to 
some extent, it may detract from a full understanding of the meaning. At the same time.
Such difficulties indicate the separation between the State's political culture and the local 
culture.
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however, since familiar identities and organizational affiliations may blind us from noticing 
subtler qualities of communication, this may have a positive value as well.
The dialogue represented here took place at the Committee's fourth m eeting.^ The 
fourth meeting took place roughly five months into a process that is scheduled to be 
completed in thirty-eight months. At the end o f thirty-eight months, the Committee is 
supposed to have produced a comprehensive management plan for the river basin. At the 
fifth month, it is still in the preliminary stage of becoming acquainted with the condition of 
the Basin, becoming acquainted with one another, and identifying issues that may have a 
bearing on its overall task.
*  *  *
Facilitator: "The next item is to come up with an agenda for next time. I'd like to suggest
that we start thinking about developing a work plan for ourselves; someone pointed 
out last time that we do have a deadline and there is alot to do. That's just my 
suggestion; there may be other topics we should look at first. That's for you to 
decide. Are there other topics we need to hear about next time?"
Member 1: "I don't have much of a handle on the agricultural interests in the upper basin as 
far as water quality is concerned. And if water quantity is what we re going to be 
looking at, I need a better idea of where that's at, too. I'm not sure what else is 
available, but Natural Resources Information System in Helena may have what 
we need."
MembCT 2: "I had them prepare a GIS for some Clark Fork sections. They have access to 
alot of information but alot of it hasn't been put together ye t It cost us quite a bit to 
have it compiled."
^  Bradford, S.; Transcripts of Upper Clark Fork Basin Committee, Meeting #4 (March 3, 
1992).
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Member 3: "We've had a base map made up and it's pretty good. It would have been here 
today but some equipment broke down."
Member 1: "Does it have information on irrigated acres?"
Member 4: "The Ag Statistical Service and the State Extension Sa-vice have a wealth of 
information."
Facilitator: "Do you think it's premature to start developing a work plan, then?"
Member 5: "Not necessarily. I think (member A's) got a good idea; getting a better picture 
o f existing demands."
Observer 1 : "The County Assessors have better information, especially on irrigated acres. 
They can tell you what's really going on. If this water reservation goes through, 
people are going to lose their water. Fish Wildlife and Parks is gonna make 
everyone put in measuring devices."
Member 3: "DNRC has a summary of claims."
Member 4: "I think it's only right to ask individual irrigators. We need to encourage more 
participation and get ideas. Maybe a questionnaire would do it"
Facilitator: "Would you be willing to draft a questionnaire for the group?"
Member 4: "Sure, I've got one right here."
Facilitator: "Should we form a committee to draft a questionnaire?"
Member 6: "I think we're getting half a step ahead of ourselves. I agree with (Member 1)
that a map would help. Some o f us are less familiar with what's going on out there, 
what the community is like, what you do when you irrigate. It would help to 
visualize it. Who are we talking about? What rights exist?"
Facilitator: "OK, So we need to know the number o f rights, the amount of water being 
used, what crops are grown, ...anything else?"
Member 6: "GIS would be a start The irrigators on the committee could give their views."
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Member 2: "Alot of the GIS layers aren't there, but its a good base map. General stuff is 
on there; diversions, waterways, geology, transportation corridors."
Member 7: 'W e're talking about initial information, on agriculture?"
Member 6: "And other uses, like municipal."
Member 8: "We've heard from special interests, but not agriculture. A Department of
Agriculture representative would have helped but Director Barclay was opposed. 
Before this committee was formed, I made a formal petition to have the Department 
of Agriculture invited and she said it wasn't a stakeholder. Now Ag doesn't want 
anything to do with it."
Member 6: "I don't even know how many districts are in the basin. What’s the picture?"
Member 9: "It’s mostly individuals. There's no real organization or anything; everyone 
has their own way o f doing things."
Member 10: T h e  1988 Clark Fork Basin Project Action Plan dealt with water quantity to 
some extent."
Member 1: "Are there people who could come in?"
Member 8: "The local Soil Conservation Service has stats. DNRC's information is way
off. That report was a good example; the numbers were all wrong; totally different 
than what's at the county. We went to (Official) and said it was wrong — (Official) 
looked straight at us and said it didn't matter."
Facilitator: "It sounds like the Conservation Service has some information they could tell us 
about."
Member 4: "Bureau of Reclamation could send someone. "
Member 7: "The Department of Agriculture could come. "
Facilitator: "Then the next meeting should focus on agricultural water use in the basin, and 
I should talk to the Ag people here about who to invite?"
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Observer 2: "The whole purpose of NRIS is to find information. It's the best source 
available and I think this is getting off the track,"
Member 5: "Let's get it all on the table; NRIS and other stuff, too."
Facilitator: "OK, we'll start with Ag next time, I would like to get responses to the
question, too — 'what are your objectives as part o f this group?’ — just so we're 
starting to think about a work plan."
Member 7: "We need to get going on the work plan."
Member 2: "Even with incomplete information, we can start working on it."
Member 11 : "Are there any other federal rights in the basin that we should be aware of? 
What about the tribes?"
Facilitator: "They do have rights here, but they say they will only talk to the Compact 
Commission; otherwise, they're not interested,"
(group falls süent)
Facilitator: "So I hear two proposals; to spend half a day on agriculture and half a day to 
start the work plan."
Member 7: "Only half a day for Ag?"
Facilitator: "Do we need more?"
Member 7: "Well... (laughs) I'm giving you a hard time, but we could probably spend 
a whole day on it"
Member 4: "I propose that we write a letter to the Soil Conservation Service asking them to 
send a person to inform us. We should write to the State Librarian too."
Member 2: "NRIS can come tell us what they've got at least."
Facilitator: "So we should spend an hour on NRIS, an hour on SCS, and I should talk to 
the ag people here and find out who else to invite? Is that OK with everyone? Any 
objections?
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(group assents)
*  *  *
This segment of dialogue is included to provide a sense of what goes on at Basin 
Committee meetings. Its rambling quality is typical of long meetings with poorly defined 
goals. This quality of wandering from one suggestion to the next, may lead one to believe 
that very little is being accomplished. But at the end of a long day, confronting the open 
ended question of what to do next time, this is to be expected. Options must be generated 
and put on the table before decisions can be made. The rambling quality is also typical of 
option generation sessions. One might conclude from this that the facilitator is not being 
active enough to move things along. But too much guidance at this stage could limit the 
Committee’s choices when it comes time to decide. There must be time for many 
suggestions and opinions to be heard before inclusive decisions can be made.
In this instance, the facilitator’s role in guiding the process seems minimal. For the 
most part, suggestions and comments were allowed to continue until the group fell silent. 
Although periodic attempts were made to summarize suggestions and package them into an 
agreeable agenda, these were passed over until the discussion reached its natural end. The 
facilitator could have pushed them to make a decision sooner, but doing so could have been 
perceived as manipulative. Interestingly, this long-windedness took the meeting well past 
its scheduled time of adjournment.^^ Apparently, the status of agriculture in the Basin was 
considered important and interesting enough to keep going despite the long day. This was 
an opportunity for ranchers to be in the spotlight and other committee members to express 
their interest in understanding the ranching community, which may have had diplomatic 
importance as well.
Ibid. Discussion finally wrapped up 30-40 minutes behind schedule.
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It is noteworthy that the facilitator brings up the work plan four times despite the 
members' obvious interest in agriculture. In view of this, his attempts at packaging are 
more than summaries o f generated options. He is clearly pushing them to consider the 
work plan. Although most members pass on this, he brings it up again at the end of the 
discussion. In view o f this, it could be argued that the facilitator is doing too much to 
manipulate the committee's decision. Member 7's objection is framed by a chuckle, but 
also reflects some surprise that "work plan" should come up again after so much discussion 
of agriculture. In general, committee members seemed to recognize that they were being 
manipulated, but took this in stride. Since the procedural importance of developing a work 
plan has been acknowledged since the first meeting, the facilitator's manipulation in this 
area was acceptable as a procedural intervention. Despite Member 7's objection, the group 
was assented to the facilitator's proposal.
This excerpt of the discussion also introduces the variety of concerns, information, 
and perspectives that the Committee's membCTS bring to the table. It shows, for example, 
that sources of valid information on irrigation and agriculture within the Basin are the 
subject of some disagreement Given that some of the discussants are adversaries with 
regard to the water reservation dispute, it also appears that some constructive interaction is 
possible between adversaries.
Disagreements. The exhibited disagreement over sources of valid information 
can be thought of as a potential minor dispute within the dispute. Because some o f the 
members are adversaries, dealing effectively with minor disagreements like this is an 
important part o f building a collaborative atmosphCTe. Reaching agreements on relatively 
minor issues like meeting agendas helps lay a foundation for the more difficult task of 
resolving major disputes. Discouraging adversarial behavior also contributes to this 
foundation.
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This disagreement over valid sources o f information provides an example of how 
disagreements can be dealt with effectively. In this case, some members have more respect 
for the State Library's Natural Resources Information System, while others consider the 
County Assessor's Offices or Soil Conservation Service better sources of information. 
Some members even suggest that there is so much variety between individual ranchers and 
farmers that the only way to get a realistic picture of what they're doing is to survey the 
whole lot of them. While the last suggestion is essentially dropped for lack of interest, a 
dispute over whether to base decisions on state or county information is avoided by the 
decision to take both sources into account. By making room for both positions a dispute is 
avoided. This is an example of joint fact-finding.
In general, joint fact-finding helps avoid adversarial behavior in two respects. First, 
it diverts attention from pending decisions. As long as there is no immediate need to make a 
decision about which source of information is better, this can be put in the background 
while attention is focussed more fruitfully on technical issues of where to find information 
and what resources are available. This gives the disputants the experience of working 
together without the pressure o f having to take positions. The technical problems of fact­
finding are easier to attack side-by-side than major issues of dispute. This is an opportunity 
for building a collaborative atmosphere, which may render major issues less divisive when 
the time comes to confront them. In addition, joint fact-finding also generates a common 
base of knowledge that Committee members can refer to when they begin to negotiate. 
Agreement on facts is a prerequisite to agreement on their significance. When factual 
disagreements arise, the only thing to do is look at the evidence and sort it out as a group. 
When the technical nature of information makes it difficult for disputants to wade through,
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this can be addressed by bringing in experts on both sides of the issue and asking them to 
explain their disagreement.^^
Developing ground rules for the group is another valuable way to avoid adversarial 
outbursts. On the one hand, agreement on ground rules adds confidence to the members 
ability to resolve more difficult issues. Ground rules also provide a formal structure that 
can be referred to when outbursts and disagreements arise. The Committee developed its 
ground rules in the second, third, and fourth meetings. At the second meeting the concept 
was introduced, some samples provided and suggestions were made. At the third meeting, 
the facilitator provided a draft for discussion and review which continued into the fourth 
meeting, at which the rules were agreed to.
The facilitator's leading role in developing these rules may help explain the 
objections to some rules which were brought up earlier. This detracted from the members' 
influence on an important part o f the process. Feeling coopted on something as 
fundamental as the ground rules is understandable cause for suspicion and dissatisfaction 
with the process. At the same time, the decision to present the Committee with a draft of 
ground rules is also understandable as a way to avoid the time-consuming activity of 
developing ground rules from scratch — an activity that diverts energy from the larger task 
of developing a basin plan. Overall, the facilitator’s action appears acceptable since review 
and revisions were also encouraged. The Committee did make some revisions and the 
standing version was accepted by consensus. The possibility of making more revisions 
later was held open in view of the possibility that future circumstances could make this 
desirable.^®
^8 Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) provide an example of this tactic.
Bradford, S.; Transcript, Meeting #3 (January 30, 1992). A vote of 3/4 of members 
present can change the ground rules.
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In addition to developing ground rules and engaging in fact-finding, collaboration
has also been advocated explicitly by the facilitator and several members. According to the
minutes of the first meeting;
(The facilitator) shared a lesson learned during his experience as a planner: 
no matter how technically correct and otherwise well written the plan may 
be, it will not amount to much unless it is credible to and supported by those 
that would actually implement it. This lesson together with the state water 
planning process gauntlet which the plan must run before it receives any 
legal recognition means that the plan will likely fail if it seeks to force any 
action on an unwilling interest in the basin. By working together, however, 
the basin's water users represented by and through the Committee - instead 
of state and/or federal bureaucrats - can jointly pursue resolution of issues 
and mutual goals regarding use of the waters of the Upper Clark Fork.^0
This statement and other affirmations of confidence in the Committee's ability to work
together and reach agreements helps create an atmosphere in which collaboration is
expected.
Some members have also acted as facilitators at difficult junctures in the discussion. 
At the fourth meeting, during the discussion following a presentation on the Clean Water 
Act, adversarial attitudes erupted between the presenter and some observers and members. 
Some members started arguing with the presenter about the costs of implementing the Act 
and the effects it would have on local industry. As the exchange increased in volume, one 
observer exclaimed that the Act would put an end to all economic development and 
demanded an economic impact statement At tiiis point, another committee member broke in 
with the firmly spoken reminder, "We need to be polite. Jim is here to inform, not 
advocate." The disruption then subsided.^^ This shows how members can contribute to the 
task of facilitation by acting as co-facilitators. Avoiding adversarial outbursts is easier when 
participants share responsibility for maintaining a constructive process.
Northern lights, "Upper Clark Fork Steering Committee, October 28,1991 Meeting 
Summary."
Bradford, S.; Transcripts, meeting #4 (March 3, 1992).
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In general, then, there are several things that can be done to prevent disagreements 
from becoming an obstacle to negotiation. Joint fact-finding, developing ground rules, 
advocacy, and intervention all contribute to promoting a collaborative environment. With 
the help of this simple tool kit, even adversaries can begin working together. Here it should 
be noted that these tools can be used throughout the process and not just as a way to set the 
stage for collaboration. Because the Basin Committee is still at the early stages of 
negotiation, tools fixing adversarial kinks in the process have not yet been needed beyond 
these. The Committee cannot provide an example of how these and additional tools might 
be used under the pressure of difficult decisions.
Inform ation Base. At this early stage of its development, the Committee's main 
task is becoming acquainted with the overall condition o f the basin and various local water 
issues. Some initial development of the work plan at the first two meetings generated a list 
of the Committee's information needs.^2 The initial list included basic knowledge on water 
law, physical water availability, water use data, fish and wildlife needs, and water quality/
Superfund concerns.^3
Because most of this information is fairly technical, the method o f becoming 
informed has been to invite local experts to give presentations and answer questions. So far 
the Committee has heard presentations on water law, water quality standards, the Berkeley 
Pit, public trust doctrine, the Clean Water Act, Superfund, Montana's Superfund, and 
z^ricultural water use. In addition, "The Clark Fork Basin Project Status Report and Action 
Plan"^4 is being used as a source of technical data on water quality. Together these people
72 Issues that the plan should address and tools for addressing them were also generated.
73 Northern Lights, "Upper Clark Fork Steering Committee, October 28, 1991 Meeting 
Summary," p. 6 - 7.
74 Johnson, Howard E. (1988).
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and paper resources provide the overview of the Basin on which Committee members will 
base their management plan.
In general, the Committee's basis o f information is limited by it members' 
perceptions of what they need to know and the limited availability and knowledge of local 
experts. While this is a substantial resource o f information, it is still limited. Laws, 
physical water availability, water use, fish and wildlife needs, water quality, and 
Superfund are constraints within which the management plan must be formed. Although 
this list seems fairly comprehensive, the fact that each category of information is treated as 
if it were discrete and separate from the others could be regarded as a serious shortcoming. 
Because the experts who provide the information tend to be specialists in a single area, the 
interconnections between these qualities of the Basin are unrepresented. In a similar vein, 
the Basin has not been addressed as an ecological system. Although fish and wildlife needs 
are being considered, there has been no mention of ecology in the process.
These omissions are serious shortcomings in the Basin Committee's information 
base. Without consideration of ecology and the interrelation of the Basin's parts, it is 
extremely unlikely that the management plan will be developed with a view toward 
sustainability. Because the Committee has been guided in its orientation and consequent 
information needs by the reservation dispute, its information base does not reflect broader 
ecological concerns. As a result, its management plan may satisfy Basin humans at the 
expense of the landscape.
Interpretation. In general, the Committee's activities at this early stage do not 
reveal major breakthroughs in comprehensive planning. Judging from the agenda-setting 
excerpt, the members will have accomplished something if they can plan their next meeting, 
let alone the future of the Basin.
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But we should not judge this too harshly. At this stage, the problem which the 
Committee is supposed to solve is still being sketched in. Defining the Basin's needs and 
capabilities more specifically will be undertaken after they develop a work plan. Developing 
a work plan, meanwhile, hinges on clarifying the objectives of participants. In order for 
these to be clarified honestly, and without adversarial obfuscation, there must be some 
degree o f trust already established in the group. Although several members seem 
comfortable with the facilitator and fairly willing to collaborate, others are n o t Initial 
informational meetings and the lesser issues of planning meeting agendas provide an 
op^rtunity  for these others to become more comfortable with the situation.
At the latest meeting, some of the members began discussing what they expect to 
achieve in the plan. One member emphasized that quantified economic values shouldn’t be 
the basis for the plan. Another advocated water marketing, but also emphasized that 
economic values should not obscure everyone's right to be here.^^ This suggests a kind of 
folk wisdom that basing our lives and decisicwis simply on economic considerations is not a 
good idea. Although both of these members seemed primarily concerned with preserving 
cultural values in the face of economic change, similar reasoning could be extended to relate 
market forces to ecological values. The relation o f established culture to the changing 
economic demands on the Basin, makes for a strange but interesting analogy to the relation 
of established ecological patterns and changing economic demands on the Basin landscape. 
Such an analogy may have potential as a tool for ecological education within the Committee 
and the Basin. It may provide a way to introduce Basin members to their role respecting the 
sustainability of cultural demands within the Basin.
Unless ecology becomes part of the Committee's information base, it is unlikely 
that sustainability will be addressed. Whether there is even time to address this in addition
DNRC; "Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee Minutes - April 15, 1992."
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to the water reservation issue is also extremely dubious. Because the Committee has a 
formal mandate, the members are under pressure to produce a plan. The Committee needs 
to focus on problem solving, not learning ecology. In view of this, introducing ideas of 
ecology and sustainability to the member's consideration may depend on framing them in 
terms of the reservation dispute. In the event that the Committee members discover the 
shortcomings o f a segmented information base, it could become useful to develop 
interrelations between the Basin’s many qualities. One way to do this might be to facilitate a 
group o f discrete experts. The viability of this remains to be seen.
In the meantime, there is reason to influence the Committee opportunistically in the 
interest of promoting its ecological awareness. The tool kit described as a way of dealing 
with disagreements is also useful for other problems. In this case, advocacy and 
intervention are ways for an observer to promote ecology within the Committee. Much as a 
member’s intervention promotes collaboration, an outsider's intervention can promote 
ecological awareness. Constant advocacy adds to this.
Finally, although the sustainability of human use of the Basin's waterways is not 
presently an issue, successful collaboration could still contribute to this end. If Basin 
members can begin to think of the Basin as a common home in which all of their interests 
must be balanced, they will be much closer than present to thinking of themselves as an 
ecological community. Thinking in relation to one another as humans may exclude the 
interests o f other species, but is at least a species o f thinking in relation to others. This 
provides a framework which is ecological in spite of itself. The Committee may not have 
time to consider ecology per se, but its success could help this come more naturally at a 
later date.
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IV. Conclusion
For untold generations, the mainstem Clark Fork Valley was a travel corridor 
between homelands of Salish and Nez Perce people and the great herds o f buffalo on the 
plains. In these times, people hunted the Basin during travel, took poles and firewood from 
its hillsides, drank, fished and bathed in its waters. The Basin was also a buffer zone 
insulating them from their enemies on the plains, the Blackfeet. Periodic burning was a 
consequence of political activity in the basin then. It helped clear trails and preserve an 
overstory to hide migrating families from the sight of their enemies. Although this shaped 
the Basin's landscape, it did not necessarily taint the basin with human interference. The 
political species is as much a part of Upper Clark Fork Basin as White Tail Deer and 
Douglas Fir.
Today, the political dwellers of the Basin belong to a different culture. These people 
have different ancestries, different interests and different institutions from the natives who 
went before them. They are different from one another as well, and rarely act as a single 
group. Today, the basin is not only a travel corridor, but a permanent residence for many 
people and their economic activities. Many decisions that affect the basin are made by 
individual property owners on the basis of culturally accepted, liberal political principles 
that grant the right o f control with ownership. Accountability to the larger community, 
human and ecological, is provided for as an afterthought by such devices as zoning 
regulations. This is overseen by representatives of the government at municipal, county and 
state levels. Public lands and resources are ruled over by a similar array of governmental 
units, including administrative agencies and boards whose jurisdictions often overlap.
This dispersion of political activity through so many institutions and individual
interests makes it difficult to form a coherent picture of the collective impact on the Basin’s
ecology. The people who affect the basin today are not one group and do not act as one
group. The Basin, however, must sustain all o f their impacts. Our institutions do not
77
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facilitate comprehensive planning, although they do facilitate an aggregate effect. As a 
result, we open ourselves up to the possibility of having a collective effect on the 
ecosystem that is neither desirable, sustainable, nor foreseeable. Our conventional 
institutions set the stage for a tragedy of the commons.
What to make of all this?
In short, the importance of achieving a sustainable relationship between our culture 
and the Basin landscape recommends that we find new institutions. Collaboration is a 
promising option. It is a way o f drawing the many diverse interests of Basin humans 
together into agreements that reflect a community. This enables existing cultural values to 
be taken up and included instead of opposed and supplanted with something alien. At the 
same time, however, the value o f cooperation and constructive discourse is nurtured. An 
atmosphere of collaboration enables value differences and diverse understandings o f the 
problem at hand to come together in a kind of cross-fertilization of ideas. By reframing the 
problems of individuals as community problems, the problem solving energies of the many 
community members are united and focussed on a single problem rather than turned against 
one another.
The problems confronting the Upper Clark Fork Basin Committee are difficult, but 
there is good reason to persevere in trying to generate discourse and agreement What other 
options are there? It is true that leaving the decision to officials might lead to a policy that 
would protect the environment in principle, but who would enforce it? At the same time, 
something must be said for the rights of the Basin’s citizens — shouldn't they have a say in 
decisions that affect their lives and homes? Property rights aside, there is a deeper issue in 
question regarding the rights of citizens to choose their own fate and have control over their 
lives and the political institutions of their country.
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This raises the issue of how to balance environmental values and democratic values. 
This can be thought o f more generally as the problem of making good decisions in a 
democratic manner. "Good decisions" in this case means decisions that are informed by 
ecology, by an understanding of how our actions affect the environment and the larger 
community around us. Local collaboration is a form of decision-making that enables local 
people to take responsibility for the policies that they must live with. At the same time, it 
provides a forum in which ecologists and experts in various fields can interact with these 
citizens in order to integrate expert and local knowledge. In view of this, it has the potential 
to generate good, inclusive, democratic decisions — but only if the process includes people 
who understand the local ecology and are committed to seeing it respected.
Ultimately, political activity is ecological, whether it regards ecology or no t It is an 
ecological force whether or not we think of it as an ecological process. So far as public 
decisions guide our actions and actions affect our living environment, this much is clear. 
This is not a revelation, but a starting point for thinking about how our political decisions 
affect the ecological complexity in which we live. That is, we begin by recognizing that our 
decisions will have such an effect. Rather than thinking o f human society as being separate 
from nature — separate from ecosystems, society can be thought o f as part of a living 
whole. From this standpoint, ecology is no more of a special interest than life is a special 
interest; it is our foundation and the frame of all our ends. In this context the role of 
environmentalists is not to banish people from nature, but to promote the recognition that 
we are part of nature and bring this into our decisions and activities.
Collaborative processes provide a path to follow into the vague territory of 
undefined agreements and communities. For those of us who support both democracy and 
ecology, this journey is a matter o f integrity; a quest in search of balance between the oft' 
dilemmic horns of ecology and democracy. Finding such a balance is worthy of ourselves
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and worthy o f our children. It is "for the seventh generation." In this spirit, we pursue 
constructive dialogue with adversarial neighbors. The Basin Committee's efforts to 
collaborate are a step in this direction. Whether the path will lead to sustainability remains 
to be seen. In the meantime, we can continue to plant the seeds of constructive dialogue and 
ecological understanding. "Let the dialogue grow!"
A thick braid of meaning is a stronger cultural tie than any one thread; 
With it we can weave a social fabric to re place fragments of modernity.
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